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ABSTRACT
This thesis contains an analysis of regulation and public policy
relating to transmission pipelines. The federal, state and local
governments, along with pipeline companies and construction
contractors are responsible for pipeline safety. The paper seeks
to ascertain what planning or policy efforts could be intiated by
one local government, Fairfax County, Virginia, to enhance the
likelihood of pipeline safety in their jurisdiction.
Traditional land use tools, such as setbacks in the Zoning
Ordinance, are evaluated, however, it is asserted that alternative
measures would be more practical and effective in achieving the
local government's goal. The paper introduces proposed
alternatives. The proposals include: construction standards which
may reduce the probability of rupture of the pipeline; fire access
and construction preplanning to attempt to improve response
capability; training programs for construction workers to increase
awareness of pipeline dangers; lobbying efforts on the part of the
local government to affect changes in federal regulations.
Thesis Supervisor: Philip B. Herr
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3INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on a local government's planning and
policy dilemmas in its attempt to address the issues and dangers
of hazardous transmission pipelines.
The paper examines what appears to be a hierarchy of
responsibility pertaining to pipeline regulation. Federal,
state, and county agencies, pipeline owners and operators,
private development companies and their subcontractors, each
has a delegated area of responsibility for pipeline safety.
The pipeline industry has the status of a national pubic
utility. The federal government has the responsibility for
regulating the creation and operation of the pipeline. The
state government has been delegated the responsibility of
regulating construction around the pipeline, presumably because
it has more capability to understand and regulate construction
in its particular terrain. However, the state delegates some
of this responsibility to the local government, in part because
of the large amount of time and local expertise required to
monitor construction activity.
The local government, in this case Fairfax County,
Virginia, can also create construction standards for development
near and around the pipeline, but these standards often rely on
the knowledge, expertise and cooperation of the pipeline
companies to share appropriate information with developers and
their subcontractors who may perform the construction work.
When a pipeline accident occurred recently in Fairfax
4County, the local government sought to re-examine its role
within this hierarchy in order to determine whether additional
safeguards could be established within its jurisdiction. The
County has directed its efforts through its "traditional" land
use control arm, the Zoning Ordinance. This thesis endeavor
analyzes the consequences of trying to create local public
policy on pipeline safety solely through the Zoning Ordinance.
In addition, alternative proposals are suggested which could add
safety measures.
5CHAPTER I: UNDERSTANDING PIPELINES
As Americans, we have become accustomed to a number of
mechanized innovations in our daily lives. Most of us do not
have to chop wood for the fireplace in order to stay warm nor
do we have to saddle our horse in order to get to town. No,
today we have gas forced hot air heating systems to provide us
with warmth and automobiles, buses, trucks, and airplanes to
transport us and our goods.
There is an underground pipeline system that
"crisscrosses" our country to deliver the fuel we need to
operate our machinery and modern conveniences. Carrying as much
as 50% of our fuel needs, pipelines are the major transporters
of energy sources throughout the United States.1 In addition,
the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) has
reported that pipelines carry 25% of the total weight of all
types of inter-city transported freight. 2 It is well accepted
that there exists no other more efficient, or safer, means of
transportation of our energy needs for homes, automobiles and
businesses. 3
Many people are familiar with the Alaskan pipeline because
of the publicity it received due to its cost, design, and
length. The trans-Alaskan pipeline, which is 48 inches in
diameter, is mostly above ground, winding through the
uninhabited natural forest of rural Alaska for some 800 miles.5
There are many other pipelines running throughout the United
6States,6 most of which cannot be seen because they are buried
underground.7  These pipelines are not just the small lines
which we know travel to houses. Some are as large in diameter
as the trans-Alaskan pipeline and travel much, much farther.8
The pipelines carry mainly fossil and synthetic fuels but
can also carry other chemical products as well.9 Fossil fuels
refer to physical elements which occur in nature and generally
are found inside the earth's surface.10  Synthetic fuels are
substances that are man-made, usually in combination with a
fossil product, and can be used to produce energy. 1 1 Generally,
fuels are in either a liquid or a gas state.12 Under certain
conditions, liquids can become gases and gases can become
liquids.13 These changes occur when temperatures and pressure
applied to the material reach extremes; however, in order to
prevent the substance from converting back to its normal state,
these external forces must remain at extremes. The liquid or
gas states of fuel substances are monitored and regulated while
in transit through the pipe.'5
It is important to note the differences between natural
gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. The hazardous liquid
pipelines carry a number of different products including: a)
low octane unleaded gasoline, b) high octane unleaded gasoline,
c) leaded gasoline, d) crude oil, e) jet fuel, f) diesel fuel,
g) kerosene and h) heating oil. 16  Natural gas transmission
pipelines usually contain 90% pure methane gas only (the other
10% is, in most uses, a tracer element). 7 These types of lines
7may have a maximum pressure capacity of more than 1600 psi.18
The natural gas carried in a transmission line is odorless,
colorless, and tasteless. 19
Pipelines vary in size and diameter.20 There are different
types of pipe for different kinds of fuels. For example,
natural gas pipelines are made of plastic while most liquid
pipelines are metal. The differences in pipe materials affect
the speed at which the substance is moved, and the size of the
pipe controls the amount of fuel which is transported within a
period of time. The larger the pipe, the more cubic feet or
barrels of fuel carried. A barrel is equal to 42 U.S. gallons.
When speaking of natural gas, the measurement is in cubic feet. 24
The pipeline system is made up of a number of different
types of lines. The largest of the pipelines is referred to as
a trunk line or transmission line.25 In non-engineering terms,
this means that a transmission pipeline, as opposed to a
gathering or distribution (main and service) pipeline,26 is a
large diameter pipe that is capable of pumping a gas or liquid
product at very high forces and quantities.27 In contrast,
gathering pipelines are usually smaller diameter lines that pump
at a lower pressure of 20 to 100 psi.28 Distribution pipelines
are the very small lines, usually carrying natural gas, which
connect to homes and businesses and operate at less than 20
psi.29 As a point of reference, the gas from a stove is usually
under about one-fourth (1/4) psi of pressure.30
The method of moving fuels through the system is by
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pushing them along within the pipe. For liquids, this procedure
entails filling the pipe with product, then following it with
another product to push the first one through the pipe.3 (See
Appendix 1.) The physics behind the working of the system is
complex but it is important to emphasize that fluids in conduits
vary in pressure and speed depending on a number of factors,
including: a) type of product, b) distance to be carried, c)
alignment of pipe, d) gravitational forces, e) diameter of pipe,
and f) resistance of opposing object.3 In order to maintain the
flow of the product, boosters called pump stations are located
along the line.3 3 The pump stations also monitor pressure drops
and adjust pressure for unloading the product at different
destinations. 34  In contrast, the pressures needed to move
natural gas through a pipe are much greater than those needed
for liquids. 35  Generally, the Maximum Allowable Operating
Pressure (MAOP) for liquid lines can range anywhere from 600 to
800 psi. 36 Due to the richness3 7 of liquid products, a leak from
this type of a line is less likely to cause a fire or an
explosion than a natural gas leak.38
Natural gas pipelines work on a principle of compressing
the gas to move it through the pipe.39 This is accomplished by
the placement of compression stations along the pipeline. The
gas is cooled for transportation in the pipe, then warmed and
odorized at its destination. 4 0 Usually, moisture vapor forms in
the gas, so heaters are used at the destination to keep the
moisture from freezing.41 Also, separators are utilized to
9remove compressor oil out of the gas. Unlike pure gasoline,42
methane can be burned in its natural state and is highly
combustible.43
The pipeline industry itself is a vast operation of many
companies involved in transporting fuel. Today, there are more
than 239,000 million miles of natural gas and 277,620 miles of
liquid45 transmission pipelines. These figures translate into
more than 292 trillion cubic feet of natural gas46 and 571
billion tons of liquids47 moving annually through the country.
The majority of natural gas is moved by pipeline,48 whereas
pipelines transport 46 percent of all crude oil and refined
products.49  The liquid pipeline operators generally ship
nationwide, which is referred to as "interstate. "5 0 The local
companies that operate only within a state are referred to as
"intrastate" pipelines.51 No matter what designation is given,
these lines are located everywhere throughout the community,
from the distribution lines which connect to private dwellings 52
to the transmission lines which cut through counties and
cities.53  The reason behind the paths of pipeline will be
discussed in another chapter, but it should be noted that many
pipeline companies have the powers of eminent domain to clear
whatever path is needed because they are viewed as a national
common carrier.54
The large transmission lines (like the trans-Alaskan
pipeline s) are one almost continuous piece of welded pipe.56
The pipe, except for compression stations and city gates for
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gas57 and pump stations and tank farms for liquid, 58 is completely
buried underground59 in easements referred to as right-of-ways. 60
The pipeline companies secure these easements from private
landowners, local, state, and/or federal authorities. 61 Securing
the easement can be a lengthy, and sometimes frustrating,
process. The operator must rent or purchase the right to cross
through a property owner's parcel or lot.62 Frustration may
arise when an owner is reluctant to sign away a very large
strip, generally 25 to 100 feet wide,63 of land for the pipeline
company to dig up. The landowner may see this as not only a
disruption, because of the construction process, but also as a
loss in land value because the easement, and any future use of
or in it, is in the sole control of the pipeline company.65
This portion of land is lost for development purposes. Also,
there may be concern for the environmental impact of the
ditching, especially in respect to stream valleys, vegetation,
trees, and crops.67 If an owner's reluctance becomes an
impediment, then the pipeline operators can utilize the power
of eminent domain to force the owner into providing the right-
of-way. Monitoring and maintaining the easement is an
important factor in preventing pipeline ruptures.69
There is one fact that is clear: no matter if the
pipelines are hidden underground, they are still extremely
dangerous, and safety measures to secure the easement are
crucial. Measures to prevent malfunctions are also necessary. 7 0
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted a
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study in 1973 which showed that most of the "failures"71 of
pipelines were due to outside forces.72 In 1983, DOT reported
that there were 1,741 pipeline failures nationwide.73  After
1983, federal reporting guidelines were changed, and fewer
failures are required now to be reported.74 Nevertheless, the
types and extent of damage from pipeline failures can be fatal.
In 1976, a gasoline pipeline in California was ruptured
when workers on a road widening project hit the pipe with
excavation equipment. A hole two and one-half inches by five
inches was punctured in the pipe. A spray of gasoline drenched
the street, the pedestrians, and the buildings across the street
from the hit. A dense vapor cloud, so thick that it was
difficult to see, formed around the area. About one and one-
half minutes after the rupture, the gasoline ignited. The
street and the sprayed buildings became a ball of fire. Nine
persons were killed, 14 persons were injured, seven buildings
and fifteen vehicles were destroyed. The cause of the ignition
of the gasoline is unclear, but it is believed to have been
caused by a truck engine.
In 1979, in Pennsylvania, a man who was in the basement
of an office building lit his cigarette creating an explosion
which killed him from fatal burns. Six corrosion-caused leaks
and a leaking clamp from the gas line connected to the building
were discovered. It was speculated that the gas entered the
basement by travelling through the ground and entering a drain
hole.
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In 1980, in Louisiana, a fracture crack in the weld of a
crude oil pipeline leaked. The oil seeped underneath a house
and was ignited by a gas hot water heater. The fire fatally
burned one person, injured another, and destroyed six homes.
The cause of the leak was attributed to an imperfection in the
base material of the steel pipe.
In 1980, in California, a pipeline which had been
operating under too much pressure burst, puncturing a hole in
the pavement above and jettisoning naphtha 20 feet into the
air.78 For unknown reasons the spray ignited, shooting flames
70 feet into the air. Five persons were injured, 12 houses were
destroyed or damaged, and 11 vehicles were destroyed. The cause
of the rupture was determined to be internal corrosion.
In 1983, in Texas, while constructing a housing
subdivision development, a drilling rig putting in holes to
plant trees struck a liquified petroleum gas (LPG) pipeline.79
The drill struck and damaged the pipe a number of times, thus
thinning the pipewall which, operating under great pressure,
ruptured. A pool of petroleum 50 yards in diameter formed and
within three minutes exploded. Six persons were killed, and
three homes, two trucks, and two cars were destroyed. It was
speculated that either a hot water heater, gasoline engine, or
electrical switch caused the explosion.
In 1985, and again in 1986, in Kentucky, natural gas
pipelines, owned by the same company, ruptured.80 The 1985
rupture created a crater 90 feet long by 38 feet wide by 12 feet
13
deep. The gas was ignited and burned an area 700 feet by 500
feet. Five persons were killed, three persons were injured, and
five homes and nine pieces of construction equipment were
destroyed. The 1986 rupture blasted 480 feet of pipe out of the
ground and ignited, injuring three persons and destroying three
homes and six vehicles. The cause of the 1985 ruptures has been
attributed to undetected corrosion; however, the cause of the
1986 rupture was placed on the company's failure to replace
previously detected corroding pipe.
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CHAPTER II: REGULATORY OVERSIGHT - NATIONAL
Unequivocally, there is a clear and definite need for
protecting and monitoring pipelines. There exists a wealth of
technical rules and a multiagency umbrella of federal regulatory
oversight relating to pipeline safety. These rules govern the
materials used in manufacturing the pipe, construction of the
pipeline, safety protections for workers, and inspections of the
easements to protect nearby inhabitants and the environment.
Federal agencies are concerned with oil industry issues such as
operating pipelines, financing projects, constructing the line,
transporting products, charging customers, protecting the
environment, guarding technology, policing the pipe, protecting
land development, analyzing regulations, investigating
incidents, and responding to leaks or accidents. In addition,
the industry itself is a lead participant in researching and
developing pipeline protections and safeguards.
The U.S. Department of Transportation is the primary
federal safety overseer of all interstate, and many intrastate,
hazardous liquid and natural gas transmission pipelines.81 DOT
regulations establish pipe specifications, pressure capacities,
class locations, protective coatings, inspection methods, and
accident prevention procedures. 8 2 The Office of Pipeline Safety,
DOT, ensures that all rules are followed precisely and is the
only agency that can set interstate transmission pipeline
standards relating to the pipe itself, its construction or
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repair. It should be noted, however, that the pipeline
easements are within the purview of the private pipeline
operators, and not DOT; therefore, local jurisdictions may
regulate non-pipeline related land development which encroaches
on, or crosses through, these easements.
Due to the nature and the quantity of the fuel being
transported by pipelines, the federal regulations begin with
standards for the pipe itself.84  It should be noted that the
standards vary depending upon whether the product to be carried
by the pipe will be liquid, gas, or other substance states. In
order to withstand extremely high pressures and continuously
flowing volumes, the pipe must be built with specific materials8 5
of certain thicknesses8 and construction specifications.87 In
addition, standards are set for the method of transporting, M
welding,89 pressure testing9o and inspecting the pipe.
Augmenting these rigorous standards, and to prevent corrosion,
the pipe is coated,92 then covered with a "cathodic" cover93 and,
sometimes, encased. A cathodic coating is a protective layer
placed over the pipe which protects against external corrosion.
In order to keep from losing any of the protective qualities,
a light electrical charge is continuously run through the
cathodic coating. However, if the coating is damaged or ripped,
corrosion of the pipe can occur at a much faster rate than if
there were no coating at all.94
The construction of the pipeline itself is also regulated
by DOT.95 This construction or "spreading" 96 of the pipeline is
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"one of the toughest, fastest, most exciting construction jobs
in the twentieth century."9 In brief, the process entails
clearing and grading the right-of-way, digging the ditch,99
laying out the pipe,100 lowering the pipe, 01 backfilling
(burying) and cleaning up. 102  Along with the regulations
promulgated by DOT, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and
the Office of Pipeline and Producer Regulation of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) , Department of Energy (DOE) ,
specify procedures for protecting construction workers and
reducing the impact on the environment, respectively. OSHA has
established general rules for protecting workers who are engaged
in site clearing, welding, trenching, and excavation
activities.103 Currently, although not as stringent as they once
were, OSHA regulations require safety protections for workers
around pipelines. However, newly proposed OSHA regulations
would require hand digging of trenches, proper support of the
pipe, safeguards against erosion, and minimization of other
negative effects.1 04  The Office of Pipeline and Producer
Regulation (OPPR) analyzes the impact of the excavation, for the
pipe, on the surrounding lands.105  Under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) , FERC requires that any natural
gas pipeline company's proposal for a new line contain an
Environmental Impact Statement assessing the topography,
physiography, geology, soils, geological hazards, species and
ecosystems, biotic resources, hydrology and land uses.
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There are numerous other regulations which safeguard the
pipes, the pipeline construction workers, and the surrounding
environment. OSHA regulations call for weld, pipe, valve and
storage tank protections.106 The Transportation Research Board
(TRB) analyzes policy relating to pipeline safety. NTSB, which
is an independent federal authority and not part of DOT, has the
responsibility of investigating pipeline ruptures. However,
NTSB has no regulatory function; only DOT can regulate pipeline
companies and pipeline operation. 10 The U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) rules require developers of
HUD-funded projects to be set back at least ten feet from the
pipeline easement and secure certification from the pipeline
company that the pipe meets all DOT specifications. 108
Considering the possibility of future negative impacts of
the pipeline on surrounding areas, DOT has a wealth of rules and
standards. DOT requires an evaluation of the area within 220
yards of a natural gas pipe. 19 It should be noted that this
requirement does not apply to liquid pipelines. Also for
natural gas pipelines, the type of pipe, pipe cover, pipe
coating, pipe thickness, pipe weld, and pipe pressure are
determined and varied by what are called class locations.110
Class locations vary with the number and type of buildings
intended for human occupancy within a 220-yard area. The "220"
yards is measured on both sides of the pipe, so in effect it is
actually a 440-yard area.11  The more densely populated the
class location, the more stringent the requirement for operation
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of the pipeline. For example, Class Location 1, ten or fewer
buildings, requires the pipe to be buried 30 inches below ground
level; whereas, Class Location 2, ten to 46 buildings, requires
the pipe to be buried 36 inches below ground level.112
For protection purposes, DOT regulates pipe materials and
requires a cathodic coating of both liquid and natural gas
pipelines. 13  The pipe's design, materials, welds, and valves
must meet different tests for strength, temperature, and
pressure.11 4 The pipes, whether steel, aluminum, copper or
plastic, must be cathodically coated and the electrical charges
must be monitored. 11 Although the class location requirements
do not apply to liquid pipelines, DOT does require that a liquid
pipeline be located no closer than 50 feet to an existing
dwelling.116 FERC also has established a review criterion which
calls for a setback standard that no natural gas pipe be located
within 50 feet of any building or dwelling.117
Under guidelines established by the Natural Gas Pipeline
Safety Grants-in-Aid Program,118 states may regulate intrastate
natural gas pipeline operators. In essence, this means that
states enforce DOT regulations which relate to natural gas
pipelines. Currently, there is legislation which would also
delegate liquid pipeline regulation to states, but there has
been no funding for this program as of yet.'19
Once the pipe is fully buried and ready for operation, DOT
rules guide the procedures for operating the pipeline as well.
The pipe must be tested to ensure that no weak points exist.
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The test is based on the specified minimum yield strength (SMYS)
of the pipe.20 In simple terms, this is a measure of how much
pressure a pipe can withstand. For transmission pipelines, the
test is for pipes that will be operating at very high
pressures.121 A pressure is established as the MAOP for the
pipe.1
The pipe system is also controlled by DOT regulations.
The pump stations, which are placed at points to keep the flow
steady, must meet high standards.123 The valving systems, which
ensure relief of extra pressure, are located at specified spaced
distances along the pipeline.124 Liquid pipelines include tank
farms for storing and relieving excess product in the pipe.125
Gathering and distribution lines must also be checked for leaks
or problems. 126
Observing and double-checking the pipeline and easement
for leaks and problems is carried out by the pipeline companies
as mandated by DOT.127 The methods of observation include aerial
reconnaissance, 12 line walks,129 and both pressure10 and
security131 checks. These safety requirements are enhanced by
the following requirements: a) an emergency procedures manual
must be kept on site at all pumping stations, and personnel must
be fully trained in these procedures;12 b) training in fire
safety and handling of equipment must be conducted with all
employees; c) local fire departments must tour the facilities
to familiarize themselves with emergency operations; d) all
employee operators must know proper shut-down procedures if
20
leaks are detected;135 and e) a 24 hour per day crew must be on
standby at all times.
In addition to the federal regulatory authorities which
have been presented, there is a vast network of agencies and
organizations participating in furthering pipeline safety covers
a broad spectrum of issues, from technology to policy. The
American Petroleum Institute and American Gas Association serve
as leaders in technological advancements,136 as well as public
policy formation and research centers.137 The Response Team of
the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan has
prepared guidelines for responding to spills of toxic and
dangerous substances.138 The National Research Council has
coordinated a number of studies of pipeline safety.139 The U.S.
General Accounting Office sponsored one of the most in-depth
assessments to date of the federal role in pipeline safety.14 0
The Environmental Protection Agency, through the newly enacted
"Title III" law, establishes emergency planning procedures in
communities throughout the country. 14 1  Also noteworthy is that
presently, Congress is considering adding new standards to the
federal regulations such as a state-wide one-call program
requirement and a rule directing operators to give to state
corporation commissions a list of all products carried and maps
of the entire pipe system. 4 2  Other agencies143 involved in
pipeline regulation include: 1) the National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners; 44 2) United States House of
Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee
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on Fossil and Synthetic Fuels;145 3) Technical Hazardous Liquid
Pipeline Safety Standards Committee;146 4) Interstate Natural
Gas Association of America; 17 5) Council on Environmental
Quality;148 6) Federal Emergency Management Agency; 14 7) Toxic
Chemical Safety and Health Project of the Environmental Policy
Institute; 1 50 8) National Emergency Management Institute; 5 9)
U.S. Army Corp of Engineers;152 and, 10) Intestate Oil Compact
153Commission.
As detailed above, policies and regulations created by
national organizations or federal agencies are concentrated in
two main areas: A) controlling the pipeline industry or B)
protecting the environment when laying a pipeline. It is
striking that no input, except on a limited basis,154 is given to
or received from the local level. This is an enigma when one
considers that the federal rules apply only to construction and
operation of the pipeline but not protection of the easement.
Third party construction in and around the easement is, it
appears, under the sole jurisdiction of state and local
authorities once the line has been laid.
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CHAPTER III: REGULATORY OVERSIGHT - LOCAL
As noted in the previous chapter, after the pipeline operator
has laid the line and buried the pipe, any non-pipeline work
being done in the easement falls under the jurisdiction of local
authorities.155 This means, for example, that if a private
contractor is constructing a building and to access the building
must install a road across the easement, the contractor must
obtain approval from the owner of the easement, in this case a
pipeline company, and in the subject jurisdiction, also must
obtain permits to commence construction. Questions arise about
the easement. First, how does one know the pipe is there if it
is buried underground? If it is buried so deep, then how could
it ever be bothered? Is the easement line marked so one can see
where the boundaries are, or is it similar to property lines
between homes, which can be seen only on a lot diagram but not
on the actual ground? If this is an interstate pipeline, do the
jurisdictional rules governing the easement vary from state to
state? If it is an intrastate line, do the jurisdictional rules
vary from town to town? Are not all the federal regulations
sufficient to protect the pipeline and the easement? This
chapter will focus on one particular jurisdiction's history with
regard to the above questions. The jurisdiction is the County
of Fairfax in the Commonwealth of Virginia. (See Appendix 2.)
Fairfax County is a suburban/rural county located
southwest of Washington, D.C. The population of the County is
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close to 700,000.156 The total land area of the County is 399
square miles.157 Like many suburban communities, Fairfax County
is experiencing the development of rural areas into residential
subdivisions, office parks, and industrial centers.158 This
development activity is sometimes near or in pipeline easements.
This has led to tragic consequences, although not all accidents
have been directly related to development activity.
On March 24, 1972, a private contractor who was doing work
for the County hit a two-inch natural gas distribution line with
his backhoe. 159 At the time, the line was being operated at only
22 psi pressure. After the damage, the gas company, but not the
fire department, was called. Of all of the persons who smelled
the gas, only one resident called the gas company. The gas
company workers could neither clamp or shut off the gas line.
About an hour and ten minutes after the rupture, the first of
three houses exploded. One of the contractor's employees and
a gas company worker attempted to evacuate the house next door
to the explosion, but it also exploded, as well as the house
next to it. Ironically, the only resident to call the gas
company, and her two children, were fatally injured.
Additionally, an employee of the contractor *was seriously
burned.
On June 9, 1974, due to a manufacturer's defect, a 30"
diameter Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation natural gas
transmission line ruptured in Bealeton, Virginia.161 Flames were
seen by airline pilots 100 miles away and reported to be two- to
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three miles high. An area 700 feet long by 400 feet wide was
totally incinerated, a hole was blasted in the ground, 118-feet
long by 37-feet wide by 7-feet deep. Shrapnel shot as far as
300 feet. A Fauquier County fire fighter reported that the
ground (dirt) was so hot one half mile away from the blaze that
water had to be put into fire fighters' boots to keep their feet
cool. The noise of the gas escaping, under 718-psi pressure,
could be heard over one mile away. In addition, because of
excess gas still remaining in the line, the pipe burned for 1-
1/2 hours after its complete shutdown. Since the rupture
occurred in an open field, there were no injuries; however, if
the rupture had been near a densely populated area, then it
would have caused a major catastrophe.
On March 6, 1980, due to the failure of pre-existing
defects, the 32-inch Colonial Pipeline Company transmission line
ruptured in Manassas, Virginia, releasing 33,000 gallons of
aviation-grade kerosene at two locations.162 The kerosene flowed
into a ditch and then, via a tributary, to Bull Run River, and
finally gushed into the Occoquan Reservoir, killing thousands
of fish and game as well as polluting a source of drinking water
for Northern Virginia. The hole in the pipe, which measured 10
feet, 10 inches long, was due to a 1,100-feet per second
pressure back surge caused by the improper shut-down of the
pipeline. Since being laid in 1963, the Manassas leak was the
first and only such rupture of this kind in Colonial's 32-inch
diameter pipeline, which is 1500 miles long. On October 13,
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1983, gas escaped from a valve at a gas company facility in
Herndon, Virginia, while a gas company crew was conducting an
inspection.163 The foreman, after not being able to shut off the
gas, evacuated the building but then re-entered the facility to
try again to close the valves. The gas exploded, fatally
injured the foreman, burned two crew workers, and damaged
neighboring residences. Although the cause of the explosion was
never determined, it was speculated that the vent fan, electric
lights, electrical switch, hot water heater, gas furnace, or gas
air conditioning could have ignited the gas. The cause of the
gas leak was the incorrect shut-down of an incoming gas line
prior to the inspection of the valves. The gas in the pipe was
at 300 psi pressure.
There are five (5) operators of transmission pipelines in
the County; three (3) of these are natural gas, 1 while the
other two (2) are hazardous liquid pipelines. 16 (See Appendix
3.)
Though the date of the installation of the first
transmission line in Fairfax County is unknown, it is clear that
this type of pipeline existed in the County in the 1960's, if
not well before that period.' During early years, although
utilities were supposed to be contacted to locate and mark their
lines,167 it was not until 1973, when the Fairfax County Board of
Supervisors adopted Chapter 6B (now Chapter 63 of the Fairfax
County Code), Excavation and Utility Line Installation, that
regulations existed that specifically govern construction work
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in or near utility line easements.16 8 These requirements were
created as a result of the Board's concern about safety during
construction activity, which was heightened by the
aforementioned tragic accident in Annandale in 1972. Due to
this tragedy, the County initiated a policy of mandating safety
requirements when doing any excavation work near an underground
utility line.
The Excavation and Utility Line Installation Code includes
requirements that a contractor notify all operators of utilities
in the area to be excavated in order to locate and mark the
existing lines. Private property owners doing work that does
not require a building permit are exempt. The Code further
specifies that the telephone numbers of all utility companies
must be clearly shown on the site, subdivision or engineering
plans. When excavation approaches a utility line, the line must
be hand dug before any other actions take place, so that its
exact location is exposed. If a new gas line is installed, an
"alert" marker, which is a three (3) inch wide metal strip with
reinforced tape, must be placed 12 to 18 inches above the line.
Also, new gas service lines169 must have an outside shut-off
valve. In addition, a communication system (command station),
approved by the Chief of the Fire and Rescue Department, must
be on-site at all times. All contractors must immediately
notify the County's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the
pipeline operator of any damage. Operators of pipelines must
maintain an emergency response crew on a 24-hour basis.
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Finally, except for transmission pipelines, the Fire and Rescue
squads must be trained to shut-off gas lines.
Since the time of the Annandale tragedy, Fairfax County
has been a member of the Metropolitan Area One-Call utility
locating service, MISS UTILITY.171  In Fairfax, a contractor
needs only to call one telephone number in order to have all
utility companies notified that excavation near their lines is
planned. MISS UTILITY, which is a private service paid for by
the utility operators, will locate lines during construction but
not for the drawing of site plans. For site plans, a utility
locating service company must be contacted to dig test pits.
172
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Also, as a result of the Annandale incident, the County created
a policy which calls for representatives of utility companies
to be present at pre-construction meetings, and each company
receives a copy of the final approved plans for a site.
After the 1980 Manassas incident, the Board of Supervisors
directed its staff to draft amendments to both the Comprehensive
Plan and the Zoning Ordinance regarding pipelines. After a
lengthy review process, the recommended changes in the
Comprehensive Plan were adopted, 4 but the amendments to the
Zoning Ordinance were deferred until "further research could be
completed. "1m  The Environment section (of the Introduc-
tion/Countywide section) of the Comprehensive Plan contains
language describing the dangers of transmission pipelines:
"The transportation of natural and other
gas and petroleum products and other
hazardous liquids through the County in
high pressure pipelines presents a
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potential danger to human life and to the
natural environment despite rigid federal
safety regulations. The County is
concerned for the safety of its residents,
labor force and visitors, and protection
of the environment as may be endangered
by the presence of these pipelines and has
adopted guidelines for the location of new
pipelines and the separation of new
development from existing pipelines."176
The Comprehensive Plan further defines and delineates the
County's environmental policy regarding pipelines by listing
the goals of the policy as
1. "Ensure maximum human safety and
environmental protection by excluding
insofar as is feasible, new natural and
other gas, petroleum product and other
hazardous liquid transmission pipelines
from developed areas, including places of
public assembly, heavy employment
concentrations and high-density
residential development, and from areas
of environmental sensitivity.
2. Minimize disturbance of environmental
quality corridors (EQCs) by, for example
- avoiding the siting of transmission
pipelines parallel to streams;
- attempting to cross EQCs at a 90
degree angle or as close as possible
to such an angle;
- siting the line to avoid the
disturbance of steep slopes next to
streams;
- implementing sedimentation and erosion
controls during construction;
- limiting off-road vehicle use of.the
right-of-way by anyone other than
maintenance personnel; and
- limiting tree clearing on the right-
of-way to only that necessary for
safety and proper maintenance of the
line.
3. Encourage the siting or clustering of
all new structures on any property, any
portion of which is within 220 yards of
a transmission pipeline, at the maximum
29
feasible distance from the pipeline
consistent with natural constraints,
parcel size, property holding and other
man-made constraints.
4. A natural and other gas transmission
pipeline means a pipeline other than a
gathering line that (a) transports gas
from a gathering line as storage facility
to a distribution line or storage
facility; (b) operates at a hoop stress
of 20 percent or more of specified minimum
yield strength, or (c) transports gas
within a storage field. A petroleum or
other hazardous liquid transmission
pipeline means all parts of a carrier's
physical facilities through which
commodities move in transportation
including, but not limited to, line pipe,
valves, and other appurtenances connected
to line pipe, pumping units, fabricated
assemblies associated with pumping units,
metering and delivery stations, and
fabricated assemblies therein and carrier-
controlled breakout tankage." 77
The Fairfax County Office of Comprehensive Planning attempts to
implement the policy articulated in the above-referenced
discussion in cases of rezonings 178 and "special exceptions." 1 79
In addition, new transmission pipelines require approval of the
County government.
The Department of Environmental Management (DEM), the
County's building and construction review and inspection agency,
invites pipeline operators to its pre-construction meetings with
builders who plan excavation near existing utility lines. DEM
staff also participates in Fairfax's Hazardous Material Core
Group, which is reviewing both emergency preparedness planning
and environmental issues related to toxic materials including
pipelines. 80 In addition, in a joint effort with the Virginia
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occupational Safety and Health Administration (VOSHA) and the
Heavy Construction Contractors Association (HCCA), DEM is
training private contractors to be sensitive to the complex
technical aspects of excavations in pipeline easements. Thus
far, DEM has trained over 3,000 private contractors in pipeline
excavation work.
As well as maintaining a direct telephone line with each
transmission pipeline company, Fire and Rescue Department staff
has established a liaison with personnel from all hazardous
liquid and natural gas operators to study and pre-plan emergency
procedures for each individual pipe. The Hazardous Materials
Unit of the Fire and Rescue Department is staffed by well
skilled experts in the management of toxic substance spills and
fires, including those involving petroleum and natural gas
products. Fire and Rescue personnel are also members of the
Hazardous Material Core Group. Additionally, the Fire and
Rescue Department maintains a close working relationship with
other Metro area fire services, which are prepared to offer
support in any needed situation, an offer which is reciprocated
by Fairfax County. In addition, the Dulles International
Airport fire unit not only has a direct line with Fairfax, but
also monitors Northern Virginia fire department radio calls.
The Department of Public Works (DPW), which constructs
and maintains County owned utility lines, keeps current on all
developments in the utility pipeline construction industry.
DPW has two (2) staff members who participate in the Northern
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Virginia Utility Committee (NVUC). NVUC not only serves as a
problem-solving forum for line operators, it is also an
effective way of keeping local jurisdictions and operators up-
to-date on new line installations and aware of new technological
advancements in the industry as a whole.
HCCA is the local trade association for construction
contractors and is involved in numerous pipeline safety projects
including membership on the Northern Virginia Utility Committee
and the MISS UTILITY Liaison Group. The latter has formed a
subcommittee which will review possible strategies for
convincing the State Legislature that the state-wide
requirements for contacting utilities may need to be
strengthened. Although it does require that a contractor notify
all utilities prior to excavation, the Commonwealth of Virginia
currently has no One-Call requirement.
The State Water Control Board (SWCB), through the
Underground Safety Act of 1968,182 has the authority in Virginia
to monitor storage and transportation of hazardous substances
which may affect groundwater or surface water. Petroleum and
gas pipelines fall into this category. Additionally, the SWCB
is responsible for developing water resource conservation and
protection policies.
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CHAPTER IV: THE PIPELINE INCIDENT
There is an umbrella of federal and state regulations relating
to pipeline safety. However, the Fairfax County legislative
body saw a need to enact further guidelines and procedures to
ensure that underground utilities, including natural gas and
hazardous liquids pipelines, are protected. It can be argued
that the County was not only a leader in establishing such
stringent local safety policies, 1 but that it had the best
possible oversight mechanisms that could greatly minimize the
risk of damage to the pipe.1 The assurances of such extensive
requirements were believed by the legislators to almost
invisibly shield the pipe from harm: hand-digging to determine
the location of the pipe; a one-call notifying system; no
blasting allowed in the easement; training in shut-off
procedures; locating services; training in work around lines;
attending pre-construction meetings; indicating utilities on
development plans; displaying telephone numbers for all
utilities on development plans; notifying operators of work
schedule; permanently marking the line; verifying rough grading
by the operator; examining all plans by contractors; properly
supporting exposed lines; maintaining 24-hour emergency response
crews; and, imprisoning and/or fining violators.18s It can be
submitted that if the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors did
not believe that this was the best regulation possible (Chapter
63, Fairfax County Code) it would have enacted more regulations.
The Board states in the Code that the regulations are "for use
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in the effective prevention of construction-related
accidents . .. 186
With all these County Code provisions, and with the state
and federal regulations in place, in 1987, at a subdivision
development in Fairfax County, damage caused by a third party
occurred to a transmission pipeline.187 The accident itself and
the immediate aftermath were life-threatening. 18 Other damage
from the accident was also extensive. 189 In addition, long-term
impacts may be foreseen from this damage. A valid question may
be asked about this accident: how could such an event happen,
especially in a jurisdiction where the "apex" of pipeline
safeguards were in place?1 90
The subdivision development was being constructed by a
national builder, U.S. Home Corporation.1 91 The development was
located in the far western region of the County. This area is
comprised of very large rural lots, sparsely populated regions,
and large vacant parcels of land.192  The Comprehensive Plan
calls for this area to be built with varying styles of housing
stock, including moderately-priced housing. 193 With this goal in
mind, the developer applied for, and received, approval of a
development plan that included townhouses of 16-foot width and
quadruplexes.194 In Fairfax County, these housing types are
usually necessary in order for the units to be moderately
priced.195 The U.S. Home development would total 660 units. The
subdivision was to be part of a larger development which
includes developments by a number of other firms.
196
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In the staff report analyzing the development proposal,
which was submitted by the Office of Cbmprehensive Planning to
the Planning Commission and the Board of Supervisors in 1984,
two references were made to the existence of a pipeline.197 The
first served to identify the location of development by stating
its relationship to the pipeline: ". . .located east of
Centreville Road abutting the .. .pipeline ."198  However, the
second reference was a stipulation that the development would
have a ".. .50 to 60 foot building (structure) setback from the
pipeline easement... . "1 A "setback," which is undefined in the
Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance,200 is a margin of spacing placed
between a structure and a physical feature of some kind.
Probably the most typical "setback" is for buildings from the
street. The Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance refers to these as
"minimum yard requirements." 201 The staff report continued by
noting that "[t]he guideline for setbacks from such easements
is 35 feet." 202 It should be noted that the setback proposed for
developments and the staff's guidelines for setbacks vary
depending on the company submitting a proposal and/or the staff
person reviewing it.203  There are no written or uniform
guidelines for setbacks in Fairfax County. Also contained in
this staff report was an environmental analysis of the
development proposal.204 The environmental analysis in its
entirety was as follows: "There are no significant
environmental impacts resulting from this special exception
action."205
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The site plans called for the construction of major
transportation and other infrastructure improvements. Much of
this work was to cross the pipeline easement, with the
operator's permission, including sewer, water, road and trail
encroachments or cut-throughs:
". .. Pipeline Company presents no objection
to the proposed construction of a 12" DIP
water main, [street], 6' unimproved
surface trail, 19" x 30" HERCP storm
sewer, and 8" sanitary sewer crossing its
32" & 36" petroleum products pipelines and
related easement with minimum vertical
clearances and reinforced concrete slabs
as shown on... [the] drawing. " 206
The developer and pipeline operator entered into a
contractual agreement about the type, timing, and extent of
construction activities that could be conducted in the easement,
as well specifying notification to the operator:
"1. Notify.. .at least 48 hours prior to
construction, subsequent maintenance
or repair, so Colonial may provide a
representative at the site. Notify
the undersigned... if... cannot be
reached.
2. The unimproved surface trail shall
maintain a minimum vertical separation
of 3.0' between finished surface and
top of pipe for the full with [sic]
of Colonial's easement.
3. Concrete slab protection is to be
installed under Singleton way [sic]
street per Colonial's drawing 1-TP-4a
attached.
4. Removal or relocation of Colonial's
pipeline markers shall not be
permitted without the approval of a
Colonial representative.
5. All underground utilities i.e. pipe
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storm drains, sewers, water lines,
natural gas lines, electric and
telephone cables shall maintain a
minimum vertical clearance of 2.0 feet
over or under Colonial's 32" & 36"
pipelines for the full width of
Colonial's easement.
6. Trees are not permitted on Colonial's
right of way.
7. No mechanized ditching shall be
allowed within five (5) feet of the
extremities of the 32" & 36"
pipelines.
8. Test holes are required to determine
the exact location and elevation of
the pipelines. Notify... (per Item 1)
so that.. .may provide a representative
at the site.
9. Stockpiling of spoilage or top soil
over the pipelines is not permitted.
10. Blasting near the pipelines shall not
be permitted without the approval of
a Colonial representative as to time
and method.
11. Temporary equipment crossings over
the pipelines are permitted with five
(5) vertical feet of cover at selected
locations as approved by Colonial's
field representative. Colored strips
of plastic shall be placed under the
temporary fill at original grade so
that original grade will not be
disturbed when temporary fill is
removed. No equipment or vehicles
may be parked over the pipelines.
12. Permanent structures are not permitted
on the easement. Manholes, junction
boxes, valve boxes, fire hydrants,
service meters, storm drain inlets,
and utility poles are considered
permanent structures.
13. Erosion control measures within the
easement including diversion dikes,
sediment traps, silt fences, gravel
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outlets, and emergency spillways will
require approval of Colonial's field
representative as to equipment and
method.
14. No excavation or construction is
permitted over Colonial's pipelines
or within its easement without a
Colonial representative being present.
Sub-grading, grading and placement of
fill over the pipelines will require
the approval of Colonial's field
representative as to equipment to be
used and method of construction.
15. U. S. HOME CORPORATION, agrees to
defend and hold Colonial Pipeline
Company harmless from all loss, cost,
or other expense, including personal
property and bodily injuries, whether
occurring to it or to Colonial, or
the respective employees, agents and
servants of either, or to third
parties, which are proximately caused
by or arise from the installation,
maintenance, or repair of the herein
permitted works, with the exception
of claims due to the sole negligence
of Colonial, provided U. S. Home or
its agent perform such maintenance or
repair.
16. This approval is granted only to the
extent of and with no actual or
implied diminishment of Colonial's
rights and interests and without
either express or implied warranty.,,207
The following summary of the incident that occurred in
Centreville, Virginia, will show that although there was clear
knowledge that the pipeline ran through the development site,
that federal, state, and local laws were in place, and that a
contractual agreement existed between the developer and the
pipeline owner, collectively these measures were not sufficient
to prevent the accident.
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Summary of Incident
On the morning of June 11, 1987, a transmission pipeline,
located in the Singleton's Grove subdivision in Centreville,
Virginia, was ruptured by a ripper attached to a D-9
Caterpillar. An employee of the subcontractor, hired by the
developer, was operating the tractor in an easement containing
32-inch and 36-inch pipelines. The pipelines are owned and
operated by Colonial Pipeline Company.
Colonial Pipeline Company products are run almost
continuously from Texas to New Jersey through lines with
diameters from 30 inches to 40 inches and have a maximum
capacity of pumping 2,400,000 barrels (100,800,000 gallons) per
day. The Colonial system in Fairfax contains two major
transmission lines (32-inch and 36-inch diameter pipes) as well
as two smaller lines (6-inch and 22-inch), which carry products
to Dulles International Airport and a tank farm in Fairfax City.
Of Colonial's transmission lines located in the Centreville
easement, the 32-inch line was laid in 1963 and the 36-inch line
in 1980.
The tractor was being operated with a rock ripper to
loosen soil and rock so that the land grade could be brought
down to the elevation of previously-installed curb. The ripper
struck the 32-inch gasoline line, causing unleaded gasoline to
be sprayed up to 150 feet into the air. It would be learned
later that the tractor operator claimed he did not know he was
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working within the easement.208
Colonial reported that, at the time of the rupture,
gasoline product was flowing at 190 pounds of pressure, or
13,500 barrels per hour. This would mean that the gasoline was
being transported at a flow rate of approximately 567,000
gallons per hour.209 Colonial also stated that, for operational
reasons, the line's pressure had recently been lowered to the
190 psi; therefore, it can be speculated that if the line had
been operating at its full capacity, the spill could have been
of an even greater magnitude.
Once punctured, the geyser-like plume of gasoline was
sprayed into the air in a northeast direction. Due in part to
the effects of both wind speed and direction, the location of
the hole was also a determinant in the angle of trajectory of
the spray. As well as covering asphalt and foliage, gasoline
product rained on top of the nearby townhomes. It has been
estimated that the plume lasted from 10 to 13 minutes--about
the time needed for personnel at Colonial's pump station to
identify that product was being lost, and then to carefully and
systematically shut down the pipe so as not to create a back
surge effect.210 Colonial estimated that 15,540 gallons of
gasoline escaped from the pipeline. This estimation is based
on a computer model that simulated the actual pipe conditions
at the time of the rupture.
Miraculously, as many federal and local investigators have
pointed out,211 the gasoline did not ignite. The various
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possible reasons for non-ignition of the product were the
subjects of many hypotheses. First, pure gasoline is not
combustible, only the vapors from the liquid can be ignited.
At the site of the puncture, the product may have been too pure
(rich) to explode. Second, the bulldozer may have been faced
in such a direction that the product was spraying away from its
diesel engine.212 Third, the on site telephone, used to call in
a report of the rupture, must have been located outside of where
vapor clouds were forming. Fourth, at the time of the
rupture, although lit cigarettes were in close proximity to the
spray, again, either the product was too rich to ignite or the-
cigarettes were extinguished before dangerous vapors could form.
Fifth, the townhomes, serviced completely by electricity,
contain no pilot lights which could have triggered an
explosion. Sixth, the time of day (9:47 a.m.) was too early
for the asphalt to be hot enough to cause combustion. Finally,
the only other probable source of fire could have been an
automobile, which was driven directly through the spray.215
The Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department was the
first County agency to respond to this emergency. The initial
call (occurred at 9:52 a.m.) reported a natural gas rupture,
which later was changed to leaded gasoline, which changed again
to unleaded gasoline. Whether the gasoline was leaded or
unleaded would not have affected the response capabilities of
the Fire Department. However, this difference would have
factored in during the clean-up operations. If it had been
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leaded gasoline, all buildings, structures, roads, foliage and
soils probably would have been completely removed due -to the
toxicity of the product.216
A Fire and Rescue command post, was established
approximately one-quarter mile away from the point of the
break,217 and Fire officials decided not to send in equipment
until the pipeline had been shut down. Once the plume ceased,
fire personnel and equipment were moved as close as possible to
the site of the rupture. 218  Foam trucks from Dulles
International Airport assisted County firefighters in spreading
ten thousand gallons of Aqueous Film Forming foam, which is the
necessary treatment for this type of spill.
The County and neighboring fire companies, who had
previously established a mutual emergency aid program, worked
together to ensure that the situation was under control at all
times. By 1:12 p.m., some three hours after the spill began,
the fifth and final alarm went out. At that point, over 150
firefighters were on the scene.
The affected area was evacuated as a precautionary measure
until all danger of surface ignition was over. Approximately
300 homes and a nearby elementary school were evacuated from
Singleton's Grove and neighboring subdivisions. Everyone,
including Colonial personnel, was barred from entering the
subdivision for any reason until the Fire Marshall determined
that no risk existed for a potential explosion.219
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Initial Stages of Cleanup
The incident occurred at the crest of a hill which caused
the gasoline to follow the path that rain water normally takes
into the storm water management 2 0 system. Gasoline at the
rupture and along unpaved overland flow paths infiltrated the
soil and percolated downward. 221 The gasoline entered the storm
water sewer lines and a vast amount was contained in the storm
water detention ponds surrounding the site. As a precaution,
artificial and/or natural flushing2 of the storm sewer system
occurred at least once a week for three consecutive weeks after
the incident. This action served to remove any free gasoline
in the water system.
On the evening of the incident, gasoline was detected in
a spring at the head of an unnamed tributary located
approximately 300 yards south of the spill site. Initially,
about eight gallons of gasoline per hour were collected.2 The
amount of gasoline subsided to 2.5 gallons per hour prior to a
heavy rainfall on June 21, ten days after the accident. Rain
significantly affected the flow of gasoline discharging from
the spring by displacing gasoline that was trapped or held in
place in soil and rock. 224 After the rainfall of June 21, the
rate of gasoline discharging from the spring increased back to
eight gallons per hour. The flow of gasoline gradually
subsided. During the week of August 10, one gallon per 24-hour
period was collected.
Until mid-August, the gasoline collection system at the
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spring was manned 24 hours a day. At that time, Colonial
Pipeline replaced the manual collection with a mechanical oil
water separator225 to collect gasoline coming from the spring.
This system allows water from the spring to run into a tank
where the gasoline was skimmed off the top of the water. The
water passes through another tank that contains absorption booms
and finally releases the water to flow into the tributary. As
an added measure, absorption booms were placed downgradient to
the tributary. During the month of October, approximately 4
gallons of oil and grease were collected by the mechanical
oil/water separator.
The unnamed tributary eventually flows into Little Rocky
Run, a stream which flows into the Occoquan Reservoir, the main
source of drinking water for the region. Containment and
absorbent booms were used along Little Rocky Run, but very
little gasoline appeared except at the confluence of the
tributary and Little Rocky Run. A dam with underflow outlets
was also constructed on Little Rocky Run for precautionary
purposes. The gasoline did not appear to contaminate the
Occoquan Reservoir or the area wells. The Virginia Water
Control Board (VWCB), Colonial Pipeline Company .and U.S. Home
Corporation individually sampled the Occoquan for gasoline
elements.226
Testing and Analysis
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Numerous tests were conducted to examine the extent of
contamination at the site, including analyses of soil and liquid
samples for hydrocarbon elements and vapors227 which are
indicators of gasoline; monitoring for explosive vapors;
identifying potential pathways for movement of gasoline in the
subsurface via a seismic refraction survey; 22 and, installing
monitoring wells229 to determine if pockets of gasoline existed
underground, if shallow groundwater beneath the site was
contaminated, and the direction of groundwater.230  Soil and
liquid samples were taken in the areas that were either directly
or indirectly affected by the spill in an effort to conduct a
comprehensive testing program.
Surface samples were taken at the development site to
determine the extent of contaminants in the soil. Test holes231
were dug to gather subsurface soil samples for chemical testing.
Laboratory results indicated a small number of positive samples.
Very few of these samples contained high concentrations of
hydrocarbons.
Organic vapors were monitored as a precaution at the test
hole sites. The VWCB felt that any intrusions into bedrock
might create additional pathways for the gasoline to migrate.
The test holes were bored to a rocky substrate, which was
impenetrable with a backhoe, a maximum of 5 feet in depth. To
monitor gasoline vapors, 2 inch PVC slotted pipe234 was installed
in the test holes.
A seismic refraction survey was conducted on site to
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characterize subsurface material types and to identify potential
pathways for movement of gasoline in the subsurface.23s The
results of the seismic survey coupled with regional
geohydrological236 data assisted in the determination of where to
place monitoring wells. The purpose of the monitoring wells
was to identify the thickness and distribution of gasoline
floating on the water table237 and the concentration of
dissolved 23 constituents in the groundwater.
Soil vapor levels were monitored throughout Singleton's
Grove to identify those areas that warranted additional
remedial239 action as a result of gasoline contamination. Two
areas were identified where removal of vapors in the soil and
bedrock was needed. Separate soil gas vacuum extraction
systems20 were employed in each of these areas to draw-out
constituents.
Vacuum extraction has been applied in a variety of
gasoline and other constituents spills throughout the United
States.241 The process involves a series of extraction wells
which are manifolded to the intake side of a blower. Air is
then drawn through the soil, the gasoline is volatilized 2 and
the vapors are withdrawn through the extraction system. These
systems operate until the constituents are consistently lower
in each extraction well; and piezometers243 indicate that the
extraction wells are effectively purging constituents from the
unsaturated soil and bedrock zone.
A soil vapor monitoring program was undertaken along the
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perimeter of townhouse units. The purpose of soil vapor
monitoring was to provide assurance that residual subsurface
gasoline contamination would not result in the accumulation of
vapors in structures being built on site that might constitute
a threat to the health and safety of current and future
residents of the subdivision.244  To date, remediation efforts
continue at Singleton's Grove.
Legislative Response
The Board of Supervisors' immediate response to the
accident at Singleton's Grove was that "setbacks" were needed
from natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines.245 The Board
decided that these setbacks should be established through an
amendment of the Zoning Ordinance.246
This was not the first time that the Board had made such
a request for "setbacks" from pipelines. In actuality, there
have been numerous other similar health and safety directives
to County staff to research, evaluate and present for
codification such regulations. In fact, the list is rather
lengthy. On September 17, 1976, the Board wanted an ordinance
which would prohibit transmission pipelines in subdivisions.247
On June 9, 1980, due to the Colonial pipeline leak in Manassas,
the Board wanted a zoning change to prevent subdivisions from
being built too close to pipelines.248 On June 28, 1982, the
Board requested that staff ". . .take another look at" requiring
a 250-foot setback.249 On October 17, 1983, after the fatal gas
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explosion in Reston the previous weekend, the Board requested
that staff "look into actions which can be taken to assure the
citizens that they are not living adjacent to explosive
situations... " and come back " . .. with language that would
tighten up the requirements..." of the Comprehensive Plan.250 On
July 23, 1984, after a 300-gallon jet fuel spill, the Board
directed staff to evaluate the Government Accounting Office
Report on pipeline safety and analyze whether the Board needed
". . to take some action concerning the County's land use plans
in order to protect life and property." 251 On November 19, 1984,
the Board requested staff to research "...whether the gas lines
were not previously required to be shown on site plans..." and
".. .the possibility of providing a procedure where citizens can
contact the County and be notified as to what easement work is
being performed in the communities. " 252 On January 14, 1985, the
Board directed staff to ". . .continue to prepare a Zoning
Ordinance amendment requiring a 10/35 foot setback... require all
rezoning applicants whose property was within 660 feet of a
high-pressure pipeline to obtain a statement from the pipeline
operator regarding the condition and pressure of the
pipeline .... "253 As of this date, neither Fairfax County nor any
other local government in the country is known to have a
"setback" requirement from pipelines.254
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CHAPTER V: ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES
As noted in the previous chapter, a desire of the Board
of Supervisors of Fairfax County was to create a safe "setback"
distance from natural gas and hazardous liquid transmission
pipelines for all buildings and structures.255  This desire
appeared to be based on the belief that a "setback" would serve
as a type of safety barrier between the pipelines and places of
human occupancy.256 The Board has directed County staff (on
numerous occasions) to draft the legal text which would
establish a required distance. However, no proposal of this
kind has ever been presented by County planners to the Board for
its approval. The probable reason for this apparent nonfeasance
is the fact that County staff was unable to calculate the
environmental impact of spills, which would be necessary to
establish the appropriate distance. In addition, there is
uncertainty about issues of financial constraints, liability,
and regulatory takings.
In order to derive a numerical distance, a great many
factors must first be evaluated. A starting point for such an
effort may be to determine whether the setback is to protect
against the potential dangers of a natural gas fire or the
effects of a hazardous liquid spill. Although many of the data
inputs would be identical, there are important differences to
consider in determining the respective setback distances.257
In attempting to predict the maximum potential amount of
a hazardous liquid which can be spilled from a rupture, certdin
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pipeline information would be needed. At the exact location
where the setback will be required, the maximum product lost
must be determined by calculating an extremely lengthy and
complex series of formulas. The formulas require data on (a)
all pipe sizes; (b) all pipe lengths to pump stations up and
downstream from the site; (c) all gradients of the pipe along
the entire length of the system; (d) type of pipes; (e) products
carried in the pipes; (f) wall thickness of pipes; (g) pressure
inside of each piece of pipe; (h) time needed to register
pressure change from the site point to pump stations; (i)
location of all relief valves and tank farms, including the
length and type of pipes connecting them; and (j) time needed
to complete entire shut down procedures, including the sequence
of the procedures.258 Due to security concerns within the
industry, a great deal of this data is protected information
which is not available to the general public.259
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
contracted with Arthur D. Little, Inc., (ADL), a scientific
research group, to calculate safe setback distances from
hazardous facilities. 26 Included in the ADL study was a
detailed evaluation of transmission pipelines. The study
focused on a number of factor equations such as spill diameter,
intensity of fire, and overpressure from an explosion.261 The
cumulative solutions to these equations were also used to
produce a specific setback from pipelines.
The pitfall of using only the HUD study method to
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calculate a setback distance for Fairfax County is that the
spill is calculated for a level, impervious surface. This
presents three distinct problems. First, there is no site that
is known in Fairfax County that contains only an impervious
surface area.262 Second, different soils, clays and bedrocks
will cause product to migrate different distances.263 Finally,
if a liquid spill reaches a major groundwater vessel, then the
product could spread for miles.26
If all pipe-specific information about the line is
available, the calculation to determine fire radius and
explosion impact would be as or more difficult to determine than
the amount of product that would be spilled. First, for the
entire area, the direction that product would flow would have
to be projected and modeled. This would entail factoring in
soil conditions, the amount of impervious surface (including
roads, sidewalks, parking lots and trails), the wind direction
and speed, the humidity, and determining areas where product
may stop and build up.26s In addition, the topography and slope
of the surrounding terrain must be analyzed. The soil types,
including grain size, amount of organic matter, thickness and
location, should be evaluated, as well as the soil's
permeability, porosity and flow percolation rates. Seismic
studies of the underground elevation of bedrock and its
fractures should be performed, along with determining water
table levels and groundwater gradients and flow paths; this
information should be verified by drilling wells in order to
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discover their precise locations and depths. All of this data
will be needed to determine where a spill may flow to, thus
enabling ignition at another source. Also, the type of product
will vary the types of fires or explosions and their ranges.26
Thus, the variables in the setback calculation will
include:
a) pipe diameter, wall thickness, grade of metal
b) pipe pressure, length of pipe from project break to
both pump stations, gradients
c) pressure conversion to gallons per second flow rate
d) product transported
e) product's chemical formula
f) product's flashpoint
g) product's solubility in water
h) products's molecular weight
i) product's National Academy of Science fire rating
j) product's acute toxic level
k) product's specific gravity
1) product's lower flammable limit
m) average weather at site
n) relative humidity at site
0) thermal conductivity of soil
p) density of soil
q) heat capacity of soil
r) type of soil
s) type of clays
t) depth to bedrock
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U) slope of ground
v) location of groundwater
w) groundwater flow rate
x) diameter of spill
y) height of fire
z) pressure of blast
aa) thermal radiation from fire
bb) probability of occurrence.
To reiterate, these variables change for each liquid product or
gas.
The probability that the pipe will rupture is also a part
of the HUD study.267 This is based on the national average
number of accidents per year. 268 Although the number of injuries
from the pipeline appears to be low, as stated by the Fairfax
County Executive, ". . .any [emphasis added] occurrence will have
a potentially severe impact on life and property if inhabited
structures are within the impact area." 269  This fact is
supported when the impact of a fire270 is calculated for a
scenario where the gasoline had ignited at Singleton's Grove.
Deriving a safe setback distance through calculation of
a series of equations appears to be theoretically possible if
all of the variables are determined. Even the pipeline
companies use computer modeling to determine the amount of a
spill from a pipe. However, since so many variables, such as
weather and soil conditions,272 are unpredictable, there is no
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accurate method of computing a safe distance. The only known
successful method of calculating spills and distances of impact
is on the trans-Alaskan pipeline.27 That calculation included
a spillage profile of the geological resources. However, the
methodology utilized is not available to the general public
because of fears of sabotage and industrial competition.
The difficulty in relying on the setback calculations for
pipelines as presented in the HUD research was realized by HUD
itself. In the 1984 proposed rulemakings advertised in the
Federal Register, HUD added specific language to its provisions
which require an "Acceptable Separation Distance"274 (ASD) from
hazardous facilities for HUD-assisted projects. The purpose
of the language was to clarify that the ASD rule does not apply
to pipelines. For pipelines, HUD uses what it calls a Minimum
Property Standard (MPS)276 of 10 feet from the pipeline easement.
It was noted in Chapter II, DOT and FERC require that new pipe
be set back 50 feet from any structure.277
Although it appears to be a foregone conclusion that
setbacks are, at best, difficult to support scientifically, this
safeguard may still be a viable approach. DOT has observed that
in most accident cases, especially those involving natural gas
pipelines, there is no danger outside of 220 yards (660 feet) .278
Therefore, there is some technical basis to support the
establishment of a setback. However, concerns may arise that
,279a setback for these purposes could be a "taking" without just
compensation.
280
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The probability of whether or not a pipeline setback of
this kind would be classified as a "taking" is unclear because
no specific case that could be discovered has tested this
concept.28 1  Nevertheless, there is case law282 which has
discussed and defined the land use "regulatory taking"28 3 issue.
Understanding some of the complexities of the judicial
interpretation and treatment of "takings" will clarify the
boundaries of this legal issue. It should be noted that the
laws affecting this issue cross both the local and state
ordinances, court rulings and codes, as well as federal and
state constitutions.
The constitutional limitations placed on zoning as to
"takings" have been outlined by the courts in different ways
for differing regulations. Historically, the test used by the
U.S. Supreme Court has been based mainly on determining whether
the regulation promotes a public purpose that is more important
than the right to private property. This means that a "taking"
has not occurred unless the land use regulation is
unreasonable. The penalties for an unreasonable regulation
can include an inverse condemnation, 28 5 compensation or a federal
Civil Rights28 Act remedy. These penalties have also been
applied to zoning regulations.287
In comparison to other "taking" claims, setbacks may be
looked at in similar light as environmental regulations.288 if
considered as one would consider an environmental problem, there
are two categories of environmental regulation in which the
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courts might find a similarity to setbacks: wetlands or
floodplains.289 In the case of wetlands regulations, the setting
aside of land in the area is to protect the natural
environment, 290 whereas floodplains regulations protect property
owners.291 However, wetlands are not similar to pipeline
setbacks because the area being protected is neither an
occurrence of nature nor a natural resource for local benefit
only. Floodplains, although an occurrence of nature, may be a
danger to life and property292 in a similar manner to pipelines;
therefore, setbacks for pipelines may not be considered a
"taking."
There have been two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases
concerning issues related to "taking." One of the cases
involved floodplain regulations; however, the Court did not rule
on whether a taking had in fact occurred.293 The other case
involved a decision about taking of land for public use, in
which the owners of the land must be compensated. In brief, a
condition was placed on a building permit for rebuilding a beach
home which required the property owner to give the locality an
easement to use for public access to the beach.294
The Court held in Nollan Et Ux v. California Coastal
Commission that "although the outright taking of an
uncompensated, permanent, public-access easement would violate
the Takings Clause, conditioning appellants' rebuilding permit
on their granting such an easement would be lawful land-use
regulation if it substantially furthered governmental purposes
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that would justify denial of the permit. The government's power
to forbid particular land uses in order to advance some
legitimate police-power purpose includes the power to condition
such use upon some concession by the owner, even a concession
of property rights, so long as the condition furthers the same
governmental purpose advanced as justification for prohibiting
the use. " 295 The holding continued by stating that ". .. [here]
the Commission's imposition of the access-easement condition
cannot be treated as an exercise of land-use regulation power
since the condition does not serve public purpose related to the
permit requirement. Of those put forth to justify it--
protecting the public's ability to see the beach, assisting the
public in overcoming a perceived 'psychological' barrier to
using the beach, and preventing beach congestion--none is
plausible."296 In the case text of Justice Scalia's opinion for
the Court, he noted that "California is free to advance its
comprehensive program, if it wishes, by using its power of
eminent domain for this 'public purpose'...but if it wants an
easement across the Nollans' property, it must pay for it." 297
It can be argued that the Nollan case differs drastically
from setbacks from pipelines, in that there is a direct
connection between the public purpose for the setback and the
benefit to the property owner. The setback does not appear to
be as inconsequential or insignificant (on its face) as a
requirement to reach the beach. There are health and safety
concerns that could rationalize a setback, not merely tanning
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and swimming.
If it were determined that a setback is a "taking," a
question of compensation may arise. It is clear that the amount
of compensation would vary based on the location and amount of
land. The costs cannot be determined,298 but the land area can
be estimated. If the estimate is based on a hypothetical lot
with a 50-foot setback and an assumption is made that it is a
square acre299 abutting a straight-line easement the amount of
land in the setback area would be 10,435.5 square feet. 300 This
would mean that nearly 25 percent of the hypothetical lot would
be in the setback. 30 1 And, for every linear mile 302 along the
easement, 264,000 square feet would be in the 50-foot setback. 303
If the estimate is based on a 660-foot setback, the setback
would occupy 3,484,000 square feet per linear mile, or 80
acres.304 In Fairfax County there are 151 miles of transmission
pipelines; therefore, a 50-foot setback would equal 79,728,000
square feet or 1830.3 acres.30s A setback may be viewed as a
taking if the distance could be viewed as excessive, merely
because of the complete loss of use of so much land.306 If the
setback is 50 feet, this may appear to be reasonable to the
state307 and court.
The remaining aspect of setbacks which causes concern is
the question of liability. In other words, can the government
be held to tort liable308 for damage to property or injury to
person if the "safe" setback distance it has established proves
to be inadequate? There appears no liability for a legislator
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acting in a legislative capacity.309 Land use and zoning have
long been deemed to be legislative acts.3 10 Notwithstanding any
current court decision, the setback, if placed in a zoning
ordinance, would be a mechanism that could help create more safe
conditions, but not guarantee them. However, the publicity of
a liability lawsuit, however unfounded, would be very
undesirable for elected County officials.
Another basis for analysis of setbacks is the comparison
with the other setbacks specified in the zoning ordinance.311
Most significant among the comparables is probably the 200-foot
setback from railroad tracks. 312  This setback is based on
assuaging the noise from the tracks, which is a protection of
person and property from the impact of a harm. Zoning
ordinances contain many setbacks: landscape and screening
regulations; yard requirements; wetlands regulations; floodplain
rules; industrial districts; parking screening; service drive
requirements; and landfill specifications.313
The question returns to whether or not the public benefit
of land use regulation outweighs one's private rights.
Governments can often utilize unchallengeable public bases or
necessities to accomplish other goals (setbacks) which may be
subject to controversy. While any court may reject beach visits
as a compelling public purpose, if the government had declared
that path an emergency access, the court may not have found the
denial of the permit unreasonable. Another example of this
philosophy is Fairfax County's 200-foot setback from rails.
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Although this regulation was created to protect against the
effects of noise, it also keeps places'of human occupancy away
from rail cars transporting ultra-hazardous materials,314 with
high accident rates.
In evaluating the pipeline safety issue and studying the
site of the Centreville incident, it is clear that there is a
need for a quick and unhampered response to any leaks along a
pipeline. When the Singleton's Grove accident occurred, the
Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department responded with 150 to
200 firefighting personnel and 49 fire apparatus units. In this
case, at the hot zone,315 the location of many of the fire units
was predetermined by the location of already-improved roads at
the site. Since some fire apparatus weigh as much as 62,000
pounds,316 locating on or traveling over product-soaked soil
could have resulted in the immobilization of these trucks.
Also, because many of the townhomes or quadruplexes had not been
completed yet, fire department personnel were unimpaired on
maneuvering and approaching the leak site without being confined
to only the easement itself or a limited area.
Fast, easy ingress for emergency personnel and vehicles
may be one of the most important factors in the quick assuaging
of the effects of a pipeline leak or fire. Therefore, a
restricted pipeline approach swath area clearance or pipeline
emergency ingress/egress maneuverability corridor strip should
be required along each side of any natural gas or hazardous
liquid transmission pipeline easement. In order to allow for
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the proper placement of emergency personnel and equipment in
case of a rupture in the pipe wall, this restricted swath area
should be restricted to fire equipment only, and should contain
enough room for vehicular turnaround from any point or location
along the entire length of the natural gas or hazardous liquid
transmission pipeline easement. The easements themselves should
not be included in the calculations of the required
maneuverability swath because, first, the pipe may be located
anywhere inside an easement 317 and, second, in the future,
another pipe may be laid next to an already existing pipe
without any prior notification as to its exact location.318
approach corridor for emergency assistance needs will provide
the minimum safeguard for persons and properties adjacent to or
in close proximity of these pipelines. A report by Arthur D.
Little, Inc., ascertained that one major attenuating factor in
evaluating the effects of fire on places of human occupancy is
the time needed for the fire department to respond to the
situation.319
Presently, the Fairfax County Public Facilities Manual320
proposes a change in the required width of an access way for
fire apparatus, from 18 feet to 24 feet. However, this access
way provision does not include the necessary turnaround space
needed for maneuvering of fire trucks, which would be a minimum
of 45 feet.321 It has been established that 45 feet will allow
for the appropriate turning path radius essential to specific
fire apparatus to enter a restricted approach swath, especially
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when other vehicles are parked on the connector street directly
in front of the corridor's entrance way. 322 If a roadway is, or
will be, located adjacent to and parallel with the easement,
then no swath area will be required on that side of the
easement. 323
In order to ensure that the response of Fire and Rescue
is always unimpeded, the ingress/egress strip should be
completed prior to the approval of any other work at a site.
Since the goal of the swath area is to provide fire personnel
flexibility in selecting the best location for their apparatus,
at no time should any obstruction be permitted within the
ingress/egress clearance.324 In addition, whereas the swath
strip must be able to withstand vehicular travel, a gravel
surface should be used as cover over the area, which should be
dedicated325 to the County to maintain. The reason for
graveling, instead of requiring a finished road, is that the
corridor should not be utilized as a crossway for private
automotive traffic and bicycles, nor parking for the same. If
a finished road is put in, nearby residents will be tempted to
use the swath for a roadway and the storage of boats or
recreational vehicles. Graveling may not completely prevent
this type of activity from occurring, but hopefully will
decrease the likelihood of such an inappropriate and illegal
use.
If the swath zone were established, all land falling
within the clear zone swath should be figured into the formula
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used for calculating the district size requirements.326
Additionally, full density credit should be given for all land
area within the emergency swath clear zone. The rationale is
that this land will be dedicated to the County, by deed, making
it the County's responsibility for maintenance and care. The
dedicated land may be included in calculations for open space
requirements, since it is inevitable that the clear zone swath
will be utilized for pedestrian traffic such as walking or
jogging; although the mechanized vehicle prohibition should be
strictly enforced.
The swath concept is based on a premise that creating this
fire accessibility will increase safety, but it is also, in
effect, a setback. This could be one alternative route to
achieving the same goal as establishing a setback from
pipelines. There may be other approaches to the safety issues
which will also control the land (but not necessarily in the
traditional sense).
In discussing the setback issue, it becomes apparent that
a population segment is inadvertently dropped from the sphere
of protection: construction workers. At Singleton's Grove,
the homes could have been set back a full 220 yards, but this
would not have stopped the rupture. If the intent is safety,
it can be submitted that accident prevention is a factor also.
Land use regulation will not prevent accidents caused by
construction activity. The Board of Supervisors was aware of
this concern. In the Board discussion of June 15, 1987,
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following the rupture in Centreville, it was requested not only
that setback rules be drafted for adoption, but also that there
should be rules to minimize the number of street crossings over
transmission pipelines. Also, the Board asked how to protect
against encroachments of the easement and what limitations were
placed on the County regarding construction close to the
pipeline.
Another pipeline safety precaution is that the ordinance
sections specifying the requirements for development and site
plans should now incorporate language in harmony with the
purpose and intent of the Comprehensive Plan. That is to say,
the proposed new language in the Zoning Ordinance will now
require that any development within 660 feet (220 yards) of a
pipeline easement must receive from the pipeline operator a
statement certifying that the line is in compliance with all
required federal and/or state safety standards. This
requirement will not only make developers very aware of the
existence of a natural gas transmission pipeline, but will also
ensure the persons who will occupy any buildings near a line
that the pipe is in sound operating order. In addition, and
again to enhance the safety of persons who will be living or
working near any hazardous liquid or natural gas transmission
pipelines, no Residential Use Permit (RUP) or Non-Residential
Use Permit (Non-RUP) will be issued until all construction work
in the pipeline easement is completed.
Enhanced construction standards, increased regulatory
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enforcement, newly created emergency response accessibility,
additional training programs, and improved industry-related
activities are proposed here as a recommended course of action
the County can take in order to create a stronger likelihood of
safety in relation to the pipelines traveling through Fairfax
County. Specific recommendations include:
A. Reduce Probability of Rupture
1. Add to Chapter 63 a requirement that anyone doing
construction must check the plats for the
location of pipelines, including private citizens
who are doing their own work.
2. Highlight, in color, the location of easements
on plans.
3. Require pipeline markings on all plans before
rough grading plans are approved to include the
exact pipe depth, gradient and location.
4. Increase the number of public utility inspectors
so that there is ample staff to be on-site
whenever work is being done in a transmission
pipeline easement.
5. Fence the entire easement, temporarily, prior to
any construction activity so that it cannot be
entered without pipeline and DEM representatives
present. Fences can be removed once construction
is finished.
6. Do not allow anything to be constructed in or
through transmission pipeline easements except
necessary roads and utility crossings (all work
to be done by the pipeline company's specialist).
7. Stiffen and enforce the fine for failure to hand-
dig and not notifying MISS UTILITY.
8. Place markers along the easement, not only along
the pipeline.
9. Allow only build-up or over-fill, not down
grading, of soil over transmission pipes.
10. Require test pits every five feet along the
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pipeline for determining its depth contour.
11. Restrict blasting within 50 feet of a
transmission pipeline.
12. Require the tiling of pipeline after any
excavation in the easement.
B. Improve Response Capability
1. Provide Fire and Rescue with Aqueous Film-Forming
Foam.
2. Install warning systems along the easement for
quicker evacuation in case of a leak or fire and
which both pipeline operators and emergency
services can activate.
3. Notify the Fire Department or any work in any
transmission pipeline easement so they will know
the exact location and the basic products that
are involved.
4. Establish an emergency preplanned routine between
the pipeline operators and all emergency services
to enable all involved to move in systematic
unison when responding to a rupture.
5. Prepare pipeline emergency plan using Fire and
Rescue's emergency plan and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency guidebook.
6. Mandate that respirators are to be worn during
any transmission pipeline rupture at the "hot
zone."
C. Increase Awareness and Training
1. Increase the advertising of MISS UTILITY and
pipeline safety throughout the County.
2. Require any contractors from outside the County
who plan work here to participate in the DEM-
sponsored training on pipeline trenching
procedures or to be licensed to perform such
work.
3. Notify nearby citizens when work is being done
in any pipeline easement.
4. Designate Pipeline Specialists in DEM, OCP, Fire
and Rescue, Police Department, DPW, and
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Department of Housing and Community Development.
5. Mandate OCP, on rezonings, to take into account
the Comprehensive Plan pipeline recommendations.
D. Expand Coordination, Lobbying, and Policy Analysis
Efforts
1. Establish a County pipeline coordination team
that will report to the Board of Supervisors and
is made up of both County agencies and private
citizens' groups, with one team member to sit on
the Northern Virginia Utility Board.
2. Lobby for a statewide one-call requirement so
any contractor who is doing business in another
jurisdiction in Virginia will know, when he/she
comes to Fairfax, that it has a one-call system.
3. Study development to determine how many buildings
and structures are within 220 yards and 50 feet-
of pipeline easements.
4. Lobby the State Corporation Commission to require
that pipelines check depth of cover annually to
determine if erosion is occurring.
5. Establish a task force of County, state and
federal agencies and construction and pipeline
industry representatives to evaluate the
Centreville accident in reference to emergency
communications, emergency response by pipeline,
fire department and police, coordination of the
response at the site, and its clean-up.
As a final note, the influence of the federal government's
role on the County's decision-making options should not be left
out of a debate on the possible strategies to protect pipeline
safety. This influence is present because the County's desire
to establish a setback is due in part to occurrences that have
been due to pipe defects and corrosion. only the federal
authorities can regulate how the pipe is operated and
maintained. The GAO study as well as numerous NTSB reports have
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pointed out the flaws in the DOT regulations and their
enforcement. The County's only option to effect changes such
as these is to lobby the federal government. As was discussed
in Chapter I, the County does not have the authority to tell the
pipeline companies where to place their lines so as to avoid
densely populated areas, thereby reducing the danger of a faulty
pipe. Only the federal government can act to increase the
standards.
The alternative strategies proposed here may restrict
development and incur costs, but because they are not based in
the Zoning Ordinance, they do not have the legal and financial
consequences that seem to accompany a setback. Yet there
appears to be fear on the part of the County which is an
obstacle to adopting these alternative solutions. The concern
over possible publicity of lawsuits regarding taking or
liability may accompany these proposals. Also, in the existing
pro-development atmosphere, elected officials are concerned over
how imposing fire swaths will impact on the aesthetic and
architectural integrity of residential developments. Private
developers may not be able to build their buildings and homes
as large as they would like, and, the loss of excess land will
affect affordability, a competing goal.
Although there may very well be valid concerns over the
alternative solutions, it is submitted that the proposed
solutions are, as alternatives, a less bitter pill to swallow
than attempting to establish a setback. Some eighteen months
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after the Singleton's Grove accident, the Board appears to be
at a stalemate and has not enacted any new policies regarding
pipeline safety, land use or otherwise. If the County's goal
of taking action to increase safety from pipeline accidents is
sincere, then the alternative proposals should be initiated,
rather than doing nothing until the next pipeline accident.
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70American Petroleum Institute. 1984, 3d ed. Introduction
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Certain cardinal principles have assured the success of
pipeline operations. One of the most important of these
principles is the best way to do the job is the safest
way. The transportation of petroleum liquids has always
been a potentially hazardous business. For more than a
century, industry has kept this basic fact in mind and has
spared no effort nor expense to keep the potential hazard
from becoming an actual hazard.
Two adjectives apply to petroleum liquids because of
their inherent nature: flammable and volatile. Flammable
means that they will burn under certain conditions;
volatile means that they will vaporize when unconfined,
with the vapors forming an explosive mixture when combined
in suitable proportions with oxygen. Because they
transport flammable products, pipeline companies go to
great lengths to see that the public, their employees, and
the environment are protected.
Cooperating with technical societies and governmental
authorities, the pipeline industry has carried out a
continuing program of research designed to eliminate
hazards--both to employees and the public. Every vessel,
every pump, and every section of pipe and its fittings
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have been designed with safety as the foremost
consideration.
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1973. NTIS, NTSB-PSS-73-1.
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73U.S. Department of Transportation. Research and Special
Programs Administration. 1985. Annual Report on Pipeline
Safety, 25, 28. It should be noted that "LNG facilities are
exempted by regulations from filing written incident
reports.... [They are) not included in the statistical summaries
presented in this annual report." p. 32.
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75National Transportation Safety Board. Pipeline Accident
Report Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) Pipeline
Rupture, Los Angeles, California, 16 June 1976. NTIS, NTSB-PAR-
76-8.
76National Transportation Safety Board. Brief of Accident
- The Peoples Natural Gas Company, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 31
July 1979. DCA-79-F-P-021.
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1980. FTW-80-F-P002.
78National Transportation Safety Board. Pipeline Accident
Report - Four Corners Pipe Line Company, Pipeline Rupture and
Fire, Long Beach, California, 1 December 1980. NTIS, NTSB-PAR-
81-4.
7National Transportation Safety Board. Pipeline Accident
Report - Mid-America Pipeline System Liquefied Petroleum Gas
Pipeline Rupture, West Odessa, Texas, 15 March 1982. NTIS,
NTSB-PAR-84 -01:
... the mobile home on Lot 8 encroached 15 feet into
MAPCO's easement and was within 10 feet of the pipeline.
Since the development of Block 43 of Chaparral Estates,
roads have been graded over the pipeline, and numerous
excavations have been made adjacent to the pipeline for
installing buried telephone cables, septic tanks, and
poles for electric power lines.
When MAPCO learned that land adjacent to its pipeline
was being developed for residential lots, additional
markers were installed over the pipeline. Even though
MAPCO was aware that its pipeline lay only 16 inches below
the surface, that roads had been graded over the pipeline,
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and that the high-pressure pipeline now would be exposed
to additional risks which might endanger a significant
number of people, no changes were made in the design or
operation of the pipeline to increase protection for
persons who would live close to the pipeline. No changes
were required by 49 CFR Part 195 (Federal requirements for
liquid pipelines).
Chapparal Estates, like many other land subdivisions,
was planned without consideration of the hazards that
might be posed to future residents by damage to pipelines
transporting hazardous materials. Moreover, Ector County
officials approved the plans for Chaparral Estates without
consideration of the effect of the development upon the
safety of MAPCO's pipeline and also without consideration
of the possible hazard to future residents posed by the
pipeline. Because neither the developer nor land planning
officials recognized the location of the pipeline within
the planned subdivision as a potential threat to the
safety of future residents, 11 lots in Block 43 were
allowed to be developed over the land occupied by MAPCO's
pipeline easement. Dwellings could not be erected or
placed on some of these lots without siting the dwelling
over the pipeline. MAPCO's first knowledge of the
development was provided by its aerial surveys when
construction activity was noted.
80National Transportation Safety Board. Pipeline Accident
Report, Texas Eastern Pipeline Company Ruptures and Fires at
Beaumont, Kentucky, on 27 April 1985 and Lancaster, Kentucky.
on 21 February 1986. NTIS, NTSB/PAR-87/01.
81Comments on GAO's Review of the Department of
Transportation's Pipeline Safety Program by 0. W. Krueger.
1984. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Fossil and Synthetic
Fuels, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of
Representatives, March 13:
The Department of Transportation administers the federal
pipeline safety program using authority contained in the
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1979, as amended. This
legislation makes the Department responsible for
establishing and enforcing safety standards for both
interstate and intrastate pipelines. States may assume
responsibility for enforcing the safety standards for all
or a portion of the intrastate pipelines located within
their borders. Some states, acting as agents of the
Department, also have been inspecting interstate
pipelines. The states' participation in the program is
strictly voluntary but participating states can obtain
federal reimbursements for up to 50 percent of the costs
incurred operating their programs.
The Department is responsible for (1) enforcing the
standards (inspecting) for those pipelines the states do
77
not assume responsibility for and (2) monitoring the
participating states to ensure that these states are
adequately enforcing the federal safety standards. In
1983, Alaska and South Dakota were the only states that
did not have a pipeline safety program. However, as of
December 31, 1982, there were 32 states that had assumed
jurisdiction over some but not all of the various types
of intrastate gas operators that existed in those states.
82U.S. Department of Transportation. Research and Special
Programs Administration. 1986. Pipeline Safety Regulations.
83Ibid.
8'Ibid., 641-647.
The list of codes and standards includes design criteria
established by the following: Aluminum Association; American
Concrete Institute; American Gas Association; American National
Standards Institute, Inc.; American Petroleum Institute;
American Society of Mechanical Engineers; American Society for
Testing and Materials; American Water Works Association;
American Welding Society; Association of American Railroads;
Bureau of Explosives; Compressed Gas Association, Inc.;
Institute of Makers of Explosives; International Conference of
Building Officials; International Organization for
Standardization; Manufacturers Standardization Society of the
Valve and Fitting Industry; National Bureau of Standards; and,
the National Fire Protection Association.
85American Petroleum Institute. 1973. Oil Pipeline
Construction and Maintenance, 93, 98:
Pipe made of various materials has been used for
thousands of years for transporting water and sewage.
While some of the projects were monumental in size and
scope and represented great technological advances at the
time, the quantities transported were small and the
distances short when compared with those of today's
pipeline industry. The pipe materials were not very
strong. This was true even of the lead, copper, and cast-
iron pipes that were used during the last few
centuries....
The use of wrought iron and steel for making pipe is a
comparatively recent development. The discovery of
petroleum in commercially significant quantities in 1859
was a great stimulus for progress in the manufacture of
iron and steel tubular goods. The production,
transportation, refining, and distribution of petroleum
and its products have led to the development of different
classes of tubular goods to meet the varying requirements
of the industry.
Processes for manufacturing wrought iron and steel with
the properties and in the quantities needed by the
78
petroleum industry were developed just prior to and during
the early stages of the oil age.
8Ibid., 29-30.
87Ibid, 98:
The strength of steel can be increased by changing its
chemical content. Yield strength can be increased by cold
working the steel. These methods have been used
singularly and in combination to raise the yield strength
of pipe, thereby increasing the allowable pressure rating.
Cold working is usually achieved by making the pipe
slightly smaller than its intended size. It is then
expanded mechanically or by internal pressure that causes
stresses in the pipe walls exceeding their yield strength.
Where internal pressure is used, expansion continues until
it is restrained by enclosing dies that stop the expansion
when the proper size pipe has been reached....
Pipe properties other than strength such as ductility,
elasticity, and grain structure of the steel need to be
considered in some cases. Heat treatment can be used
along with chemical formulation of the steel to obtain the
desired properties and the pipe may be furnished as
rolled, normalized and tempered, quenched and tempered,
subcritically stress-relieved, or subcritically age-
hardened.
8Ibid., 55:
Line pipe is subject to various forms of damage and
deterioration during its movement from pipe mills to the
pipeline right-of-way. Specifications intended to
minimize this damage or deterioration may be implemented
by including appropriate terms in purchase orders,
shipping instructions, and arrangements for interim
storage. Construction specifications usually provide in
the job description that pipe will be available to the
contractor at locations reasonably close to the right-of-
way. These may be railway delivery points, barge
terminals, ocean shipping ports, storage yards, pipe
coating plants, or pipe mills. The contractor may be
required to arrange for unloading from railroad cars or
barges and truck transportation by properly licensed and
authorized haulers from these locations to the right-of-
way. The haulers also perform the construction operation
of stringing the pipe. This operation consists of
unloading individual lengths of pipe and placing them in
an end-to-end arrangement along the right-of-way. Lifting
the pipe from stringing trucks and placing it on the
ground and supporting pads in such a manner that it will
be properly placed for pipe paving operations, with proper
spacing between lengths and without damage to the pipe or
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its protective coating, requires skill and care on the
part of pipe stringers.
89Ibid., 72-73:
Pipeline welding requires the exercise of arts and
skills by the welder that can be acquired only by study
and practice. Industry standards and governmental
regulations require that welders demonstrate their skill
and competence by making sample welds similar to those to
be made on the project. These welds are examined and
tested for strength, ductility, and other properties as
part of a prescribed qualification procedure. API
Standard 1104, Standard for Welding Pipe Line and Related
Facilities, describes the qualification procedures that
must be carried out before a welder is permitted to work
on a project. the procedure provides for retesting of
welders as needed and the maintenance of welder
qualification reports.
API Standard 1104 provides for qualification of proposed
welding procedures. The quality of sample welds made by
the proposed procedure on pipe similar to that which will
be used is determined by destructive testing. Methods of
testing and examination as well as standards of
acceptability are given.
90Ibid., 91:
Hydrostatic testing is usually performed by construction
contractors, but companies specializing in the work may
perform it on subcontracts or on direct contract with the
pipeline company. Such tests are used to prove that all
parts of a pipeline are strong enough for the intended
service. Internal test pressures may be subject to
regulation by governmental agencies. Hydrostatic test
procedures are usually described in considerable detail
in specifications. Locations and lengths of individual
test sections and applicable pressures are given.
91Ibid., 75:
Visual Inspection of welds and observation of welding
operations are relied upon to some extent by welding
foremen and company inspectors for detecting weld defects
and indicating when further examination of certain welds
is advisable... .Radiographic examination is a
nondestructive method of inspecting the inner structure
of welds and determining or inferring the presence of
defects. Radiographic pictures are made by binding film
sensitive to X or gamma rays in close contact with a weld
and allowing these rays to flow through the weld and
adjacent pipe material. Sources of the rays may be X-ray
machines or radioisotopes.
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92Ibid., 123-124:
Covering metal with a waterproof, electrically
nonconductive coating is an age-old method of corrosion
control. Pipeline coatings need special properties. An
industry of considerable size has grown up to develop,
produce, and apply such coatings. It should be apparent
to anyone familiar with the realities of pipeline
construction that a completely waterproof, electrically
nonconductive coating for an entire pipeline is a goal
that may be approached but never fully achieved. Coating
materials and application procedures are available that
provide an acceptable degree of corrosion control.
93128:
At the beginning of this discussion of methods of
corrosion control it was suggested that control could be
achieved by making all parts of the pipeline cathodic.
Cathodic protection does exactly that. It may be
visualized as collecting all the anodes of all existing
and potential corrosion cells and transferring them to a
place of the pipeline operator's choosing. This is
accomplished by creating and controlling the action of
large corrosion cells. These cells are formed by
connecting the negative terminals of direct-current power
sources to the pipeline and connecting the positive
terminals to expendable solid conductors buried in the
ground .... These solid conductors are called anodes and
interconnected groups of them are often called ground
beds. The electrical circuits are completed by current
flowing through the soil from the anodes to the pipeline
and along the pipeline to the current source.
94Al Garnett, DOT, interview by author, 17 July 1987,
Washington, D.C.
95U.S. Department of Transportation. Research and Special
Programs Administration. 1986. Pipeline Safety Regulations.
9 6American Petroleum Institute. 1973. Oil Pipeline
Construction and Maintenance.
97Ibid., 61.
98Ibid., 62:
The term clearing includes removal of above-ground
obstacles to work such as trees, brush, crops, and
boulders. It also includes removal of tree stumps and
roots in the ditch line that would interfere with
operation of the ditching machine. The term grading means
leveling the ground surfaces as needed to permit transit
and operation of vehicles and equipment and to permit
placement of the pipeline at the desired elevation. This
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involves cutting away the earth in some places and
building it up in others. Construction of roads and
bridges, diverting streams, stabilizing soil to support
heavy equipment, and various other kinds of work are often
needed. Generally, the right-of-way is cleared and graded
to a width of 50 feet, but greater widths are not
uncommon.
9Ibid. , 54:
The course or path of the center line of the ditch
should be described with respect to location of survey
lines as shown on alignment maps and survey stakes showing
locations of these lines. Most often the ditch centerline
follows the staked survey line but may be offset to either
side. Depth of ditch is usually defined as that required
to provide the specified amount of cover when the ground
surface is returned to its normal level. In some cases
the depth of burial is governed by laws and regulations.
The nature and use of the land has a bearing on the amount
of cover needed.
10OIbid. , 56:
Pipe laying consists of the operations required for
joining individual pipe lengths, valves, and fittings into
a continuous conduit for flow of fluids. Individual pipe
lengths are bent as needed to conform with vertical and
horizontal changes in direction of the ditch. The former
practice of heating pipe to facilitate bending is no
longer permitted because of the harmful effects of heat
on most pipe metals. Bends should be made in a manner
that avoids metallurgical and dimensional damage to the
pipe and minimizes damage to protective coatings. Pipe
ends are prepared for welding by inspecting them for
damage, repairing damages, and cleaning by wire brushing
or if necessary by abrasive grinding. A swab should be
run through each pipe length just before it is placed in
alignment for welding to insure removal of large objects,
much of the loose dirt, and mill scale. Pipe with
longitudinal welding seams should have these seams placed
so that they will be kept above the center line of the
pipeline. The seams in adjacent lengths should not be
aligned.
101Ibid. , 57-58:
Lowering consists of placing the completed pipeline in
the ditch. It must be specified that lowering will be
permitted only when an inspector is present. This permits
the inspector to determine whether the pipe is ready for
burial and whether the ditch is ready to receive it... .The
pipe must be placed in the ditch in such manner that
preformed pipe bends will fit the corresponding bends in
the ditch.
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Backfilling consists of covering the pipe with the earth
removed from the ditch or with other specially prepared
material and completely filling the ditch so that normal
ground level is restored. The usual method is that of
pushing or pulling the excavated earth back to the edge
of the ditch and allowing it to fall in....
Cleanup includes removal and disposition of refuse and
surplus materials from the right-of-way. Rock blasted
from the ditch can be a major cleanup item, especially in
cultivate land areas. A common specification is that the
contractor shall arrange for disposal sites, collect all
rocks that would interfere with normal use of the land,
and haul the rocks to the disposal sites. Also included
in cleanup is leveling the right-of-way area by filling
deep ruts and removing mounds of dirt. The degree of need
for leveling and dressing the ground surface varies widely
in different localities, and the appropriate one should
be specified. Removal of temporary fence gates and
bridges and restoration of fences, ground cover, and water
courses are also included in cleanup.
103U.S. Department of Labor. Occupational Safety and
Health Administration. Construction Industry. ([Washington,
D.C.]: U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, 1987), 87, 200-210.
104Federal Register. 1987. April 15, Vol. 52, No. 72,
12288-12339.
105Code of Federal Regulations. 1988. 18 CFR CL 1, April
1, 300-313.
106UJ.S. Department of Labor. Occupational Safety and
Health Administration. Construction Industry, 88, 1-191-230.
107Comments on Pipeline Safety by C. H. Batten. 1984.
Hearings Before the Fossil and Synthetic Fuels Subcommittee,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives,
March 13:
Mr. Chairman, I am Charles H. Batten, Chief of the
National Transportation Safety Board's Hazardous Materials
and Pipeline Accident Division. With me is Mr. Henry M.
Shepherd, who is a pipeline accident investigator within
the Division. On behalf of the Safety Board, I am pleased
to respond to the Subcommittee's request for Board
comments concerning pipeline safety.
Under the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 as
revised on November 3, 1981, the Safety Board is charged
to investigate or cause to be investigated specific types
of pipeline accidents to determine the facts, conditions,
and circumstances, to determine the probable cause of
83
these accidents and to develop safety recommendations for
reducing the probability of their recurrence. Since 1969,
when the Board began investigating pipeline accidents and,
with an average of only three investigators, we have
investigated over 300 accidents and written 59 major
accident reports and 148 other reports. Additionally, we
have conducted seven major safety studies identifying
safety improvements which should be incorporated into the
Department of Transportation's pipeline safety program.
We have issued a total of 741 safety recommendations, of
which 165 were directed to the Department of
Transportation's Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA) or its predecessor organizations.
108 U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office
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118Comments of the Reauthorization of the Natural Gas and
Hazardous Liquids Pipeline Safety Grants-in-Aid Programs by W.
J. Hernandez. 1984. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fossil
and Synthetic Fuels, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of
Representatives, March 9, p. 3:
Since its enactment in 1968, the Natural Gas Pipeline
Safety Grants-In-Aid Program... has proved to be a model
of Federal-State cooperation in its efficient
implementation of gas pipeline safety standards. * As
administered through the RSPA, the pipeline safety program
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provides up to 50 percent in matching funds to assist
participating States in enforcing gas pipeline safety
regulations. The Federal-State cooperation for this
program has worked effectively, but funding in the past
has been insufficient to provide the full 50 percent
matching funds authorized by law.
119Ibid., 8.
120U.S. Department of Transportation. Research and Special
Programs Administration. 1986. Pipeline Safety Regulations,
517.
121Al Garnett, DOT, interview by author, 17 July 1987,
Washington, D.C.:
A high pressure pipeline is one which operates at a hoop
stress of 20% or more of specified minimum yield strength
(SMYS) ... and is generally larger than six (6) inches in
diameter.
122Al Garnett, DOT, interview by author, 17 July 1987,
Washington, D.C.:
Generally, the MAOP for liquid pipelines can range
anywhere from 600 to 800 psi. For natural gas pipelines,
the MAOP may vary with the class locations, but in general
the pressure ranges from 100-1700 psi.
123U.S. Department of Transportation. Research and Special
Programs Administration. 1986. Pipeline Safety Regulations,
526-528, 563-564, 599, 625-626.
124American Petroleum Institute. 1973. Oil Pipeline
Construction and Maintenance, 107:
Valves, the second main type of pipeline fittings, are
special fittings in that they are not static parts of
piping systems but are means of providing various forms
of control of the fluid being transported. The most
common form of control is that of stopping flow completely
in the portion of the pipe containing a valve by closing
it or permitting flow with the least practical impedance
by opening it. Many types of valves have been developed
to provide this control, and different types will be
discussed briefly. The latest edition of API Standard 6D,
API Specifications for Steel Pipeline Valves, applies.
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Construction and Maintenance, 143:
The most common form of information gathering is done
by aerial patrol on a weekly or biweekly schedule. During
these patrols, the pilots watch for and report
developments and changes on and adjacent to the right-of-
way that may result in the need for maintenance. Often
the first indication the patrol pilot sees is a spot of
wilted vegetation. However, many changes are gradual and
may take several years to reach stages that require
maintenance work. Soil erosion, stream bed changes,
weathering of pipeline markers, and signs of growth of
brush and trees on the right-of-way are examples.
Construction work adjacent to or approaching the right-
of-way is noted and reported. Sometimes knowledge of such
work is not received through other channels. Local
pipeline managers investigate such activities and attempt
to prevent possible damage by providing information as to
locations of pipelines and arranging for their
representatives to be present when excavation may result
in exposure of the pipelines. Finding leaks, reporting
their locations, and estimating their size and nature are
prime responsibilities of air patrol pilots. Special
flights are made to find leaks indicated by drops in
pressure, meter readings, or other data.
129Ibid., 143:
The employee classification of linewalker has been in
existence almost as long as pipelines. While aerial
patrol has taken over most of the linewalkers' work, they
are still needed for certain places such as densely
populated areas where minimum regulated flying heights do
not permit adequate inspection from the air. Linewalkers
also use means of transportation such as riding horses,
motorcycles, swamp buggies, or boats as the occasion
permits or demands. Covering the right-of-way at ground
level is still required occasionally when emergencies
occur during periods of darkness or bad weather that
prevents aerial patrol.
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Department of Energy Organization Act 42 U.S.C. 7101
Clean Air Act (1967 Act Amended) 42 U.S.C. 7401
Environmental Quality Improvement Act 42 U.S.C. 4317
Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. 1251
Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act 15
U.S.C. 791
Safe Drinking Water Act 42 U.S.C. 300
NEPA Amendments 42 U.S.C. 4332
Toxic Substances Control Act 15 U.S.C. 2601
Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act 42 U.S.C. 6244
Clean Water Act Amendments 33 U.S.C. 1251
Soil and Water Resources Conservation Act 16 U.S.C. 2001
Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA)
Ground Water Protection Act of 1985
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
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144The National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners is a nationwide organization of state and local
government officials overseeing utilities.
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155Ralph Kubitz, DOT, interview by author, 11 August 1987,
Washington, D.C.
156Fairfax County, Office of Public Affairs. 1986, rev.
ed. Fairfax County Citizen's Handbook, 1.
157Ibid.
158Fairfax County, Office of Research and Statistics,
Research and Analysis Branch. 1988. Standard Reports, 245-246.
159National Transportation Safety Board. Pipeline Accident
Report, Washington Gas Light Company Natural Gas Explosion at
Annandale, Virginia, 24 March 1972. NTIS-NTSB-PAR-72-4, 20:
WGL's leak record. In 1971, WGL received 85,756 leak
reports, 50 percent of which turned out to be actual
leaks. In addition to the leaks reported to WGL by people
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outside the company, WGL also discovered the location of
almost 1,000 leaks through its own surveys.
In its 1971 report to the Office of Pipeline Safety, WGL
indicated that it repaired 11,608 leaks on its
distribution system, 2,791 of which were caused by damage
to WGL's facilities during construction activities.
Although this represents an average of 54 damage-type
leaks per week, the daily rate varied. One day, for
example, 25 lines were damaged by construction activities.
160Ibid., 5-7:
The machine operator was taking light scoops to avoid
breaking the 42-inch sewer. He did not realize that the
gas main lay buried 3.14 feet below the surface of the
street at that spot. At about 7:50, after making three
passes with the backhoe, he realized that he had hit
something 'very heavy.' He released the power and moved
the bucket aside. The pipe was not broken where it was
hit, but it was pulled ... .Although workmen generally guide
the machine operator when he is near underground
facilities, when the line was snagged no one was directing
the operator's work....
The WGL crew arrived on the scene between 8:30 and 8:40
a.m., confirmed that a 2-inch main had been pulled and
reported to their foreman by radio. After the foreman
arrived on the scene, he was informed by the dispatcher
that in order to shut off the affected area it would be
necessary to close two valves to the east and two valves
to the west of Magdalene Court.
When the crew arrived, the odor of gas was heavy,
especially in the trench. The crew began to dig around
the 2-inch main where it was snagged in order to confirm
its size and to prepare to cut the line and place a 2-inch
compression coupled valve on the end to stop the flow of
gas. No attempt was made by the crew to check for the
presence of gas in or around any of the nearby buildings
or structures....
Shortly before 9 a.m., there was an explosion in the
house. The woman, in the dining room at the time, picked
up her infant son and attempted to leave the house from
the kitchen door. The door was jammed shut and could not
be opened. The front door was also jammed shut. She then
saw an opening in the front wall near the front door
caused by the explosion and was able to leave the house
by squeezing through the opening. The house did not
appear to be burning at that time.
When the explosion occurred at 4911 Magdalene Court,
both the foreman for the gas company and the foreman for
the Hopke Company called their offices on their radios,
reported the explosion, and requested assistance. At
exactly 9 a.m. the county emergency operation ceriter
received a call from a resident in the area. Nine
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additional calls were received at 9:01. The foreman for
the gas company ordered his men to turn off the gas meters
at the houses on the Court and' to evacuate the people.
He had thought the meters were on the outside of the
houses; however, they were on the inside.
A gas company employee and the machine operator ran into
the court and were informed by the resident of 4911 that
there was no one in the home except for her dog. They
then attempted to evacuate the house at 4909. Finding the
front door open, they entered the hallway and called to
two children they saw in the basement, asking them if
their mother was at home. The children, who were aged 3
and 1-1/2 years, did not seem to understand and did not
move. The machine operator felt a rumble beneath his
feet, turned around, and ran from the house. As he
reached the sidewalk, the house exploded violently. The
machine operator threw himself to the ground, but the WGL
employee was thrown back out into the street with his
clothing burning.
The house was almost completely destroyed by this blast.
The only other occupant in the house at the time, the
mother of the two children, was blown out of the back of
the house.
161National Transportation Safety Board. Trans-continental
Gas Pine Line Corporation, 30 inch Transmission Line Failure
Near Bealeton, Virginia, 9 June 1974. NTIS, NTSB-PAR-75-2.
162National Transportation Safety Board. Pipeline Accident
Report, Colonial Pipeline Company Petroleum Products Pipeline
Failures, Manassas and Locust Grove, Virginia, 6 March 1980.
NTIS, NTSB-PAR-81-2.
163Angel 0. Garcia, Petroleum Engineer, National
Transportation Safety Board, March 28, 1984, letter to Raymond
M. Moats, Office of the Fire Marshal, Fire and Rescue Services,
Fairfax County.
164Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation, Transcontinental
Gas Pipe Line Corporation and Washington Gas Light Company.
165Colonial Pipeline Company and Plantation Pipe Line
Company.
16There are pipeline construction applications on file in
Fairfax County Archives dating back to 1960.
167Fairfax County Code. Supp. No. 1, 12-77 Sec. 12.8.1,
30-132, 30-125, 30-133.
16Ibid., Chapter 63.
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169Service line - a small pipeline leading to, or used as,
a distribution line.
170A One-Call system is a centralized notification service
which contacts all the utilities that have lines running through
where a proposed excavation is to occur.
171Not all jurisdictions in Northern Virginia are members
of MISS UTILITY.
2A test pit is the method used to locate a line by boring
a small hole through the ground until it reaches the pipe.
17Fairfax County, Office of Comprehensive Planning,
Development in Relation to Pipeline Locations (Fairfax,
Virginia: Board of Supervisors, 5 October 1981), 15.
174Comprehensive Plan of the County of Fairfax Virginia.
1983 Edition. 478
17 5Ibid.
176Ibid.
1mIbid.
178Fairfax County, Office of Comprehensive Planning, The
Proffer System in Land Use Regulation in Fairfax County,
Virginia (Fairfax, Virginia: Board of Supervisors, 1 November
1985).
179Ibid.
180The group consists of members from Fire and Rescue, the
Police Department, the Department of Environmental Management,
the Department of Public Works, the Waste Water Treatment and
Solid Waste groups, the Health Department, Risk Management, the
Environmental Quality Advisory Council (a citizen organization)
and the Office of Comprehensive Planning.
181The Northern Virginia Utility Committee is an informal
discussion group, made up of utility operators and local
jurisdictions, started in the mid-70's. The committee, which
meets bi-monthly, addresses concerns, of both owners and
governments alike, which relate to the safe operation and
maintenance of utility lines. There are many notable
accomplishments of the committee, such as the Damage Prevention
Committee, a spinoff of the larger group, which is looking at
ways to increase public awareness of the existence of
underground lines. All of the transmission pipeline owners have
representatives on the Utility Committee. The Heavy
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Construction Contractors Association is the only private
representative member of the committee.
182Fairfax County, Office of Comprehensive Planning, 1988
Annual Report on the Environment, 42.
183Mark Wendorff, Washington Gas Light Company, interview
by author, 12 January 1988, Washington, D.C.
184Ibid.
185Fairfax County Code. Supp. No. 1, 12-77. Chapter 63.
186Ibid., 12.
187Patricia Davis and John Ward Anderson, "Break In
Gasoline Pipeline Forces Evacuation in Fairfax," The Washington
Post, 12 June 1987, Sec. A, 1.
188Ibid.
189Ibid.
190Mark Wendorff, Washington Gas Light Company, interview by
author, 12 January 1988, Washington, D.C.
191Fairfax County, Office of Comprehensive Planning, Staff
Report Application Number SE 84-S-049, Springfield District
(Fairfax, Virginia: Board of Supervisors, 12 September 1984).
19 2Ibid.
193Ibid.
194ibid.,, 1.
195Fairfax County, Office of Research and Statistics,
Research and Analysis Branch. Standard Reports, 11.
196Fairfax County, Office of Comprehensive Planning. Staff
Report Application Number SE84-S-049, Springfield District.
197Ibid.
198Ibid., 1.
199Ibid., 2.
200Fairfax County Code. Chapter 112.
2 0 1Ibid.
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202Fairfax County, Office of Comprehensive Planning, Staff
Report Application Number SE84-S-049, Springfield District.
203The County's proffer system allows developers to
negotiate what type of zoning rules apply to its proposed
project. It is called "conditional zoning."
204 Fairfax County, Office of Comprehensive Planning, Staff
Report Application Number SE84-S-049, Springfield District.
20 5Ibid., 2.
206G. J. Paisley, Baltimore Area Manager, Colonial Pipeline
Company, December 17, 1986, letter to Tom Lovell, U.S. Home
Corporation.
207Ibid.
208Statement by E. F. Gregory. Verbatim.
209567,000 gallons/hour equals 9,450 gals/min or 157.5
gals/sec.
210Ralph Kubitz, DOT, interviewed by author, 11 August
1987, Washington, D.C.: The maximum allowable operating
pressure (MAOP) for this pipe is 657 psi. To allow for the
detour of product to tank farm, Colonial has to lower the
pressure in order to slow the travel of product so that it can
be fed into the smaller lines which connect with the tanks. To
shut-down the pipeline, a very accurate method or procedure must
be followed in order to avoid creating a pressure surge, a sort
of shock wave. Due to the physics of fluid hydraulics, if a
stream of liquid completely stops its flow, a wave will be sent
back down the stream. In this case, since the flow rate was at
9,450 gals/min in a 32" diameter pipe, it can be presumed that
a pressure surge may have caused serious damage to the line at
another point or increase the damage at the point of rupture.
In order to prevent the possibility of this result, relief tanks
must be opened to fill with product, pumps pushing the product
must be shut down, then all the line valves closed.
211Ibid.
212Ibid.: Although a diesel engine works by air
compression so there is no electric spark, there are ways that
these motors can ignite gasoline vapor.
213Ibid.: A telephone, when the receiver is lifted,
creates an electrical arc which can ignite a flammable gas. The
U.S. Department of Transportation has reported this as a cause
of an LNG (Liquified Natural Gas) explosion.
93
214 Ibid.: The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has
reported that there have been cases where the electrical arc
inside a light switch has caused the combustion of vapors.
According to DOT, it is standard practice at natural gas
facilities to have rules that state that, if gas odor is
prevalent inside a building, no one is to use the telephone or
turn on or off any lights.
215The driver, a resident of Singleton's Grove, later
reported that he thought that it was only water. In this case,
it has been speculated that, one, because the car was new, there
were no spark plug wire electrical arcs and, two, that the
engine must have been running "too rich" (the carburetor's gas-
air ratio contained too much gas) so that it did not stall when
entering or exiting the spray. If the latter had occurred, it
can be presumed that the driver would have attempted to restart
his engine, thus causing an electrical arc in the starter motor
and possibly resulting in an explosion.
216Lead is a toxin which has been connected with illnesses
such as paralysis.
217It was reported that gas vapors were detected one-
quarter mile away.
218Because roads adjacent to the break were unpaved, truck
units had to be situated farther away, on improved surfaces.
219Colonial personnel were prevented from entering the site
until the Colonial supervisor contacted the emergency command
center.
220Fairfax County, Office of Comprehensive Planning,
Environmental Impact Evaluation, Design with Natural Systems
(Fairfax, Virginia: Board of Supervisors, January 1980), 51.
221American Petroleum Institute. 1979, repr. 1986.
Underground Movement of Gasoline on Groundwater and Enhanced
Recovery by Surfactants, 5-8.
2 22Manually flushing the system and rain water flushing the
system, respectively.
223American Petroleum Institute. 1980, 1st ed.
Underground Spill Cleanup Manual, 23-30.
224Ibid., 11. Because water and gasoline have different
properties, soil retains them differently.
225Ibid.
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226American Petroleum Institute. 1979. repr. 1986.
Underground Movement of Gasoline on Groundwater and Enhanced
Recovery by Surfactants. Health and Environmental Sciences
Department, Texas Research Institute. API Publication 4317, 8.
227American Petroleum Institute.
Underground Spill Cleanup Manual, 29-32.
228
"Understanding The Underground: The
Cleanup," Hazardous Waste Management.
229American Petroleum Institute. 1980,
Spill Cleanup Manual, 29-32.
1980, 1st ed.
First Step Toward
1st ed. Underline
230 Ibid., 18.
231Ibid., 14-18.
232Ibid., 18.
233Ibid., 11.
234Ibid., 4-6.
235
"Understanding The Underground: The First Step Toward
Cleanup," Hazardous Waste Management Fall 1987.
236Ibid., 4-5.
23 7American Petroleum Institute.
Underground Spill CleanuD Manual.
1980, 1st ed.
238 Ibid. , 11.
239
"Understanding the Underground: The First Step Toward
Cleanup," Hazardous Waste Management, Fall 1987.
240American Petroleum Institute. 1980, 1st ed. Underground
Spill Cleanup Manual.
241Ibid., 23.
24 2 Ibid.
243American Petroleum Institute. 1979, repr. 1986.
Underground Movement of Gasoline on Groundwater and Enhanced
Recovery by Surfactants.
244American Petroleum Institute.
Underground Spill Cleanup Manual, 31-32.
1980, 1st ed.
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245Fairfax County, Office of Comprehensive Planning,
Gasoline Rupture in Centreville, (Fairfax, Virginia: Board of
Supervisors, 15 June 1987), 6.
246Ibid.
247Fairfax County, Office of Comprehensive Planning,
Prohibition of Transmission Line in Subdivision Lots, (Fairfax,
Virginia: Board of Supervisors, 17 September 1976).
248Fairfax County, Office of Comprehensive Planning, Annual
Plan Review, (Fairfax, Virginia: Board of Supervisors, March
1982), 44.
249Fairfax County, Office of Comprehensive Planning, Item
in Countywide Plan Review Re. Pipeline Construction, (Fairfax,
Virginia: Board of Supervisors, 28 June 1982), 6.
250Fairfax County, Office of Comprehensive Planning,
Concern For Safety From Gas Explosions in The County, (Fairfax,
Virginia: Board of Supervisor, 17 October 1983).
251Fairfax County, Office of Comprehensive Planning,
Spilling of Jet Fuel in The County, (Fairfax, Virginia: Board
of Supervisors, 23 July 1984).
252Fairfax County, Office of Comprehensive Planning,
Relationship of Gasoline Pipeline to Subdivision Lots, (Fairfax,
Virginia: Board of Supervisors, 19 November 1984).
253Fairfax County, Office of Comprehensive Planning,
Pipeline Safety, (Fairfax, Virginia: Board of Supervisors, 14
January 1985).
254Local Government Information Network (LOGIN) request,
September 15, 1987. County of Fairfax Virginia. No response
to request for information on setback requirements in zoning
ordinances or code provisions or regulations pertaining to
transmission pipelines.
255Fairfax County Code. Supp. No. 1, 12-77. Chapter 112,
20-32, definition is "[t]hat which is built or constructed."
256This is an assumption of the author derived from the
discussion by the Board on June 15, 1987, about the protection
of County citizens from harm due to pipeline accidents. Board
Summary, June 15, 1987.
257U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office
of Policy Development and Research. Safety Considerations in
Siting Housing Projects. [Washington, D.C.] U.S. Department
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of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development,
1975.
Urban Development Siting with Respect to Hazardous
Commercial/Industrial Facilities, Rolf Jensen, 1982.
258Al Garnett, DOT, interview by author, 17 July 1987,
Washington, D.C.
259A1 Garnett, DOT, interview by author, 17 July 1987,
Washington, D.C.
260U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Office of Policy Development and Research. Safety
Considerations in Siting Housing Projects.
26 1 1bid.: The equation to calculate the flow rate is
U! = _Ge (P2 - P1)2 p
where U = velocity of liquid flow in the pipe (ft/sec)
G= 32.2 poundal/lb. force
P2= pipeline pressure (lb.f/sq.ft.)
P = atmospheric pressure (lb.f/sq.ft)
p = density of the liquid fuel-531b/cu.ft.
This can be stated as:
G - 77.68 D2\-p-15
where G = liquid flow rate (gallons/sec.)
D = diameter of pipe (ft.)
p = pipeline maximum pressure (psi)
If using the Colonial pipeline incident as an example, 190 psi
(the pressure at the time of the accident) into the above
equation, with a 32-inch diameter (2.67 ft.)
77.68 D2\-P-15
77.68(2.67)2 190-15
77.68 x 7.13 x 13.23 = 7326 gal.
The pipeline was not shut down for 10 minutes. (10 minutes =
600 seconds).
600 x 7326 = 4,395,849.6 gallons
Note that the initial estimate of the spill at Singleton's Grove
was 21,000 gallons. This difference is due to the fact that the
ADL calculation is based on a complete guillotine break in the
line, but the Colonial line was only punctured.
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Also, the variable for pressure of blast, is calculated
differently for gases than for liquids. For gases, the formula
is to solve an equation for the "TNT equivalent" using
TNTe = RT ln P/P2
ATNTM
Where TNTe = TNT equivalent (lb.TNT/lb. gas or gmTNT/gMgas)
R = molar gas constant = 1.987 cal/mole*K
T = final temperature = 300*K
P1 = initial pressure at which rupture takes place (psi)
P2= final pressure - 14.7 psi
M = molecular weight of gas (lb./lb. mole or gm/gm mole)
ATNT = work function TNT - 1120 cal/gm
262Fairfax County Code. Supp. No. 1, 12-77. Chapter 13.
Fairfax County has many requirements for landscaping, and open
space.
263American Petroleum Institute. 1979. repr. 1986.
Underground Movement of Gasoline on Groundwater and Enhanced
Recovery by Surfactants.
264Ibid.
265 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Office of Policy Development and Research. Safety
Considerations in Siting Housing Projects.
266Ibid.
267Ibid.
26The results of the calculation are, for Fairfax County,
one fatality every 200 years and one injury every 30 years from
a pipeline accident. In reality, in one twelve-year period
there were four deaths. It can be speculated that if the
product had ignited at Singleton's Grove, there would have been
upwards of ten fatalities.
269Memo from J. Hamilton Lambert, County Executive, Fairfax
County, June 14, 1984, to the Board of Supervisors.
270For 21,000 gallons spilled
Fire Width = 290 feet
Fire Height = 235 feet
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Fire Area = 66,700 square feet
Fire Separation (People) = 975 feet
Fire Separation (Building) = 205 feet
This means that there should be no impact on people 975 feet
away. But this assumes that all of the gasoline is contained
in one area and that the fire is ignited immediately.
271U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Office of Policy Development and Research. Safety
Considerations in Siting Housing Proiects, 61-68. If it is
windy, then the fire may be blown in a direction farther than
calculated.
272American Petroleum Institute. 1979, repr. 1986.
Underground Movement of Gasoline on Groundwater and Enhanced
Recovery by Surfactants.
27The trans-Alaskan pipeline route was studied and mapped
for soil conditions, hydrology, topography, and geology to
determine the best placement of the valving system in order to
minimize the amount of oil spilled from a leak. Lloyd Ulrich,
DOT. DOT, OPS Docket No. Pct. 74-12.
27 4Federal Register, February 10, 1984, 5100-5108. The
Arthur D. Little, Inc., study along with the Rolf Jensen &
Associates study is used by HUD to calculate setback safety
distances for HUD-funded housing projects.
275Hazardous facilities are defined as storage facilities
which contain 100 gallons or more of combustible liquids or
"...substances of an explosive or fire prone nature." This also
includes liquid propelled ICBM missile sites. Federal Register,
February 10, 1984, 5103.
276The HUD rule is no closer than 10 feet to the easement
of a pipeline.
277U.S. Department of Transportation. Research and Special
Programs Administration. Pipeline Safety Regulations.
([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department of Transportation,
Research and Special Programs Administration, 1986), 575-582.
DOT's 50-foot setback applies to liquid lines, whereas FERC's
applies to natural gas. It has been stated by federal
authorities that the 50 feet is not based on any research or
calculation. Al Garnett of DOT also has a calculation for a
"dispersion distance" for Liquified Natural Gas facilities.
2781.S. DOT, Section 193. However, DOT personnel have
suggested that the 220 yards is not based on research but is an
engineering mapping scale.
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219Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law, 15-16.
"The fifth amendment to the U.'S. Constitution provides
that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation." Most state constitutions contain
similar clauses, and the fourteenth amendment makes the federal
taking clause applicable to states. The taking clause raises
the all-important taking issue in land use regulation. Local
governments enact land use regulations under their police power,
which does not require payment.
Compensation. When a land use regulation excessively
restricts the use of land without compensation, the restricted
landowner can argue that a taking of his land without
compensation has occurred.
A strict reading of the taking clause would suggest that
it does not apply to land use regulation, but only when a
government entity takes or physically occupies land for a public
use.
A land use regulation, as enacted, may be so restrictive
that no application of its requirements can avoid a taking. An
example might be an open space regulation that allows no
substantial development of any kind. In this type of case the
land use regulation may be a "facial" taking of property, and
landowners can bring a facial challenge to its restrictions
based on the taking clause.
Other land use regulations may not be a facial taking but
may possibly be a taking "as applied" to a particular property.
An example is a zoning ordinance dividing a community into land
use districts. The ordinance may not be a taking as applied to
some property, but may be a taking as applied to other property
it covers. In this example, a landowner can argue that the
zoning ordinance is a taking "as applied" to his property.
The judicial remedies available for an unconstitutional
taking of property must also be understood. Read literally, the
taking clause forbids the taking of property without
compensation. It appears to require compensation when a land
use regulation takes property without making compensation
available. Despite this literal reading, the state courts do
not provide compensation for an unconstitutional taking. They
simply invalidate the land use regulation, although there are
some exceptions to this rule in some states.
Cases also arise in which the landowner brings an "inverse
condemnation" action to claim compensation for an
unconstitutional taking. The action is inverse because the
landowner rather than the government entity brings the action
in court to claim compensation under the taking clause."
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280Ibid.
28 1See note #254.
282Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. " stare decisis.
283Daniel R Mandelker, Land Use Law, 16-17.
An analysis of taking doctrine is complicated by the
failure of most courts to clearly articulate their taking
theory. Taking doctrine can be clarified by dividing
taking cases into categories that distinguish the taking
problems courts consider...
The following categories are one possible grouping,
although they are not always easy to apply. They do
reflect academic theories of the taking clause, which are
discussed later and which sometimes appear in the court
decisions...
The categories selected here include only those cases
in which the property owner claims a "regulatory" taking
of land through land use regulation. The "physical
occupation" cases, in which a government entity physically
occupies land, are excluded. An example is the case in
which a government entity constructs a highway embankment
that causes flooding on adjacent land. The courts usually
find a taking in the physical occupation cases.
28Ibid. Sec, 8.19
Federal and state constitutions prohibit the taking of
property without just compensation. In theory, this
provision authorizes an award of compensation to a
landowner when a court finds that her property has been
"taken" by a land use regulation. A taking occurs when
a land use regulation, such as a zoning ordinance, applies
a classification to the landowner's property that a court
finds unreasonable. Courts differ in the tests they apply
to determine whether a taking has occurred. A commonly
applied standard requires a finding that no reasonable
use of the land is possible.
Inverse condemnation is a remedy implied from the
Constitution and in most states is self-executing. The
landowner bases his action for inverse condemnation
directly on the Constitution, and a statute conferring the
remedy is not required. Landowners may also bring inverse
condemnation actions based on the federal taking clause
in federal court.
The landowner's condemnation action is "inverse" or
"reverse" because he claims that the municipality has
taken his property through land use regulation, but has
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not paid the compensation to which he is entitled. The
landowner asks the court to compel an award of
compensation for the property interest that has been
taken.
Inverse condemnation is a remedy to enforce a
constitutional obligation. This remedy does not
independently provide constitutional protection for the
property owner from excessive land use regulation. A
landowner may bring an inverse condemnation action only
if the court first finds that a taking has occurred."
285Ibid.
28Ibid., Sec. 8.26 and 8.27
Section 1983 of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any
State..., subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. U.S.C. Section 1983.
The basic elements of a Section 1983 action require
plaintiffs to prove a deprivation of rights secured by the
Constitution or federal laws by a defendant acting under "color
of law." Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
The "color of law" requirement in Section 1983 is usually
coextensive with the state action requirement imposed under the
fourteenth amendment. "Color of law" is present not only when
officials act within the scope of their authority but also when
they misuse authority conferred by a statute or ordinance.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Under Monell, Section
8.25, a municipality is also liable for a constitutional
deprivation based on a "policy statement, ordinance, regulation,
or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's
officers."
287Ibid., Sec. 8.33
A local zoning action that is clearly arbitrary can
provide the basis for a Section 1983 action. In Wheeler
v. City of Pleasant Grove, 664 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1981),
the city revoked a building permit for an apartment
complex after a local referendum showed overwhelming
resistance to the project. The court upheld a finding
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that a Section 1983 violation had occurred. It held that
the ordinance revoking the permit was a 'confiscatory
measure' that was a taking of property. Neither was 'the
city's purpose in enacting the measure.. .rational.'
288The Comprehensive Plan of Fairfax County's policy
statements regarding pipelines is located in the Environmental
Policy section of the Plan.
289Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law , 325.
Federal, state, and local governments have adopted a
number of regulatory programs for the protection of
environmental areas. These programs include wetland and
floodplain regulation and zoning for the protection of
agricultural land.
29 0 Ibid.
Wetland regulation imposes restrictive controls in wetland
areas to preserve their environmental function by keeping them
free from development.
29 1Ibid.
Floodplain regulation imposes restrictive controls in
floodways and adjacent floodplains. These controls restrict
development in areas where flooding can cause loss of life and
damage to property.
292Ibid., Sec. 12.8.
The cases have upheld floodplain regulations against
taking objections. [10]. The prevention of flood damage
serves well-established police power purposes and supports
the constitutionality of restrictions on development
imposed by floodplain ordinances.
Although not having quite the influence the Just case,
Section 12.6 has had on wetlands taking cases, Turnpike
Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, Section 12.7, is an early
leading case, upholding floodplain regulations against
taking objections. The court upheld a floodplain
ordinance prohibiting all developmental uses, even though
the value of the restricted property was allegedly reduced
from $431,000 to $53,000. The court held that floodplain
regulation purposes...flood danger, protected other
landowners from floodplain development, and protected the
'entire community from individual choices of land use
which require subsequent public expenditures for public
works and disaster relief.' The court also held that the
property owner had not been deprived of all of the use of
its land as a number of nonstructural uses were allowed.
The court balanced the restrictions on the property
'against the potential harm to the community from
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overdevelopment of a flood plain area.' It then applied
standard taking law to find no taking even though there
had been a substantial diminution in the value of the
restricted property. [11].
A number of cases have emphasized flood dangers in
rejecting taking objections to floodplain regulations.
[12]. More recent floodplain taking cases, like the
wetland cases, have also been influenced by the favorable
holding in Penn Central. See Section 12.6 Krahl v. Nine
Mile Creek Watershed Dist., 283 N.W.2d 538 (Minn, 1979),
is a case in this category. A landowner denied a permit
to construct a building in a floodplain brought an action
challenging the floodplain regulation as a taking. The
court observed that the filing necessary for the building
would create a flood danger, noted that a number of
nonstructural uses of the land were allowed, and applied
a balancing test to uphold the regulation. The court also
noted that the restrictions on the land were not permanent
and would be modified once permanent flood control
facilities were constructed. The court cited Penn Central
for the proposition that 'this is not a case where a
property owner is burdened with a restriction without
receiving a reciprocal benefit in is favor.' (13).
An even stronger statement that the ecological purposes
of floodplain regulation resolve taking questions appeared
in Usdin v. State, 414 A.2d 280(N.J.L. 1980), aff'd, 430
A.2d 949 (N.J. App. Div. 1981):
(A) proper balancing of ecology... is
critically significant in determining
whether a compensable taking has occurred.
If the purpose of the restriction was to
prevent an abuse and the restrictions are
reasonably related to that end, the act
of restricting is a proper exercise of the
police power.
General approval of floodplain regulation, of course,
does not preclude taking objections when a floodplain
restriction is not supported by a finding that flood
dangers exist on the restricted property.. Sturdy Homes,
Inc. v. Township of Redford, 186 N.W.2d 43 (Mich. App.
1971). (14).
29 3
"Takings" by Land Use Regulations, Michael S. Horwatt,
1.: "The Court in First Church did not consider the flood
control ordinance at issue actually constituted a 'taking. '."
Also see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles 55 U.S.L.W.1199.
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294Slip Opinion. Nollan Et Ux v. California Coastal
Commission, No. 86-133. (U.S. Supreme Court, decided 26 June
1987).
295ibid., I.
296 Ibid.
297Ibid., 15-16.
298Fairfax County Office of Research and Statistics. The
average value of a single family home in Fairfax County is
$203,000.
299An acre is 43,560 square feet. Therefore, a perfectly
square acre would have sides of 208.7 feet each.
300208.7 ft. x 50 ft. = 10,435.5 square feet
30110,435.5/43.560 = .24 or approximately 25 percent.
302A mile = 5,280 feet
3035,280 ft. x 50 ft. = 264,000 sq. feet
264,000/43,560 = 6.0 acres
out of 25.3 acres
3045,280 ft. x 660 ft. = 3,484,000 sq. feet
3,484,000/43,560 = 80.0 acres
305151 miles x 5280 ft. = 797,280 feet
797,280 ft. x 100 ft. (50 ft. on each side of the
easement) = 79,728,000 sq. ft.
79,728,000/43,560 = 1,830.3 acres
306U.S. Supreme Court has been using a heightened scrutiny
in analysis of land use regulations. And the court, as one
legal observer has noted, is finding more on equitable, or fair,
ground rather than technical. Professor Joseph Broudis, George
Mason University Law School.
307Grayson P. Haynes, "Litigating a Zoning Case." Virginia
Bar News , June 1987, 17.
Dillon Rule is followed in Virginia. The rule is that
localities cannot create any laws nor act in any function unless
that power has been specifically conferred on it by the state.
308Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law, Sec. 8.23.:
The exercise of zoning and planning functions is held
to be a governmental activity for which no tort liability
attaches under the historical rule that local governments
are immune from liability for damages arising out of the
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exercise of governmental activities. Practically all
states have now abolished governmental immunity in tort
and have enacted statutes or adopted judicial doctrine
imposing tort liability on municipalities. Under these
statutes and judicial doctrines, municipalities usually
remain immune for the performance of discretionary as
distinguished from ministerial functions, a category that
includes most land use control responsibilities.
309Ibid., 7.:
The Supreme Court has recognized absolute immunity for
federal, state, and regional legislators when acting in
a legislative capacity. Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S.
at 404. It has not ruled on the immunity of purely local
legislators. Id. at 404 n.26. However, most circuits
have extended absolute immunity to local legislative
officers. E.g., Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96 (3d
Cir. 1983); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d
1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1982); Hernandez, 643 F.2d at 1193;
Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 613 (8th
Cir. 1980); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 279 (4th Cir.
1980).
310Ibid.:
The enactment of zoning and land use regulations is a
legislative action. See Kuzinich, 689 F.2d at 1349
(enactment of general zoning ordinance legislative act);
Hernandez, 643 F.2d at 1191 (mayor's veto of re-zoning
ordinance legislative act) ; Gorman Towers, 626 F.2d at 613
(passage of zoning ordinance legislative act); Bruce, 631
F.2d at 279-280 (voting on ordinance and meeting with
partisans of challenged ordinance legislative activities).
However, actions that are more specific than enactment
of general zoning ordinances may be administrative or
executive in nature rather than legislative. See Cutting
v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1984) (imposition of
conditions on granting of specific permit administrative
act); Kuzinich, 689 F.2d at 1350.
311Fairfax County Code. Supp. No. 1, 12-77. Sec. 2-414.
312U.S. Department of Transportation. Research and Special
Programs Administration. Pipeline Safety Regulations.
313Fairfax County Code. Supp. No. 1, 12-77. Chapter 112.
314U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office
of Policy Development and Research. Safety Considerations in
Siting Housing Projects. ([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development
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and Research, 1975), 29. Chlorine is transported by rail. The
evacuation area for a spill may be measured in miles.
315Hot Zone is a Fire Department term meaning the exact
point or location of an emergency condition, and its immediate
vicinity (i.e., the place from which fire department personnel
must use equipment to quell or subdue an actual or potential
fire).
316Fairfax County 1988 Public Facilities Manual.
317In the southwestern portion of Fairfax County, one
easement contains a 36-inch Columbia and a 30-inch Washington
Gas natural gas transmission pipeline alongside a 6-inch
Plantation hazardous liquid transmission pipeline.
318In 1980, when Colonial laid its 36" line, no special
exception applications or building permits were required because
these types of pipelines need only to have a Planning
Commission, Code of Virginia Title 15.1-456, public hearing for
approval.
319U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office
of Policy Development and Research, Safety Considerations in
Siting Housing Projects.
320Fairfax County 1988 Public Facilities Manual.
The turning path radius for larger vehicles, as
specified in the American Association of State Highways and
Transportation Officials (AASHTO) Manual titled "A Policy on
Geometric Design of Highways and Streets," is 45 feet.
322Fairfax County 1988 Public Facilities Manual.
323At Singleton's Grove, the site plans show that the
proposed New Braddock Road will run parallel and immediately
adjacent to the north side of the Colonial easement. This
street would fulfill the suggested restricted approach swath
requirements on one side of the pipeline.
324On a visit to the Singleton's Grove site, it was
observed that the pipeline easement was being utilized as a
storage area for a large steam shovel and the wooden A-frames
for some of the homes under construction. It is within
Colonial's purview to allow such activity, but this would
clearly impede vehicular movement if the easement were needed
as a fire equipment ingress/egress maneuverability corridor.
Also, mounds of dirt had been piled up on top of the easement
and pipeline markers had been knocked down.
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325Virginia Citizens Planning Association. 1984, 2d ed.,
Community Planning Series, Vol 5., The Language of Planning.
Virginia Cooperative Extension Service and Virginia Department
of Housing and Community Development, Richmond, Virginia, 11:
The transfer of property rights from private to public
ownership. Land so conveyed to the local government may
be used for streets, schools, parks, utilities, etc. The
governing body must formally accept the dedication for the
transaction to be complete.
326Ibid., 17.
APPENDIX I
Fairfax County At A Glance
County Formed .............. June 19, 1742
Net Area ...... .......... 399 square miles
Pupulation, January 1985............. 668,290
Number of Public Schools 1985-86........ .158
Special Education Centers ................ 20
School Membership 1985-86 ........... 125,516
Highest Land Elevation .............. 580 feet
Because postal addresses use place names without regard for actual boundaries, many
residences and public facilities which actually are in Fairfax County have postal addresses sug-
gesting that they are in the Cities of Fairfax, Falls Church or Alexandria.
In this handbook, supervisor districts, planning districts or neighborhood names such as
Groveton and Franconia have been substituted for mailing addresses in many instances to clarify
the locations of County facilities.
APPENDIX II
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[ COMPATIBLE INTERFACES
E TRANSMIX (INTERFACE MATERIAL
WHICH MUST BE REPROCESSED)
Figure 6.3. A typical products cycle of a products pipelne system iCourtesy of ?e Association of Oil Pipe Lines)
appearance of the product serves to verify the change
from one shipment to another.
In transport, gasolines and distillate fuel oils are
handled on a fungible or segregated shipment basis.
At the present time, kerosines are shipped only on a
fungible basis (i.e., confined with other kerosine hav-
ing essentially the same properties with deliveries
being made from any portion of the combined stream).
This process allows shippers to tender smaller
volumes (25,000 barrels minimum) than would be re-
quired for a segregated shipment (75,000 barrels
minimum).
Figure 6.3 is a schematic representation of a typical
cycle of batches. The sequence of products shown
varies according to the types of products offered for
shipment. The drawing represents a situation that
A
Figure 6.4. A sphere is used to clear water and sediment from
a pipeline. (Courtesy of the Association of Oil Pipe Lines)
might exist at any given time on a products line. It
should be pointed out that it is not drawn to scale. For
example, an interface might range from a few barrels
to perhaps 15,000 barrels, while a batch of products
might comprise a million barrels.
Batch Separators and Scrapers
Segregation of shipment occasionally (although not
normally) is achieved via use of batch separators. In
most cases, no separator is required since products
move in turbulent flow regimen and the commingling
of products at interfaces between shipments is trac-
table.
A common use of line scrapers or spheres is for
pipeline cleaning (fig. 6.4). Regular scraper runs will
remove water and sediment from the pipeline, thereby
preserving product quality.
Booster stations along the line are designed to
automatically pass the scrapers and spheres. Input
stations, junctions, termini, and points where line
diameter changes are normally equipped with receiv-
ing or launching traps for retrieving spheres and
scrapers from the line or inserting them into a line
leaving the station.
Product Measurement
Practically all measurements are made either by tur-
bine meters (fig. 6.5) or positive-displacement meters
(fig. 6.6). Conventional tank gauging of volumes may
be resorted to in unusual situations.
Meter readings taken before and after deliveries are
utilized to determine the volume of throughput. Meters
are typically equipped with transmitting, remote-
reading, and printout accessories to facilitate the
delivery of correct product volumes and for prepara-
tion of delivery tickets. Often the data are transmitted
to remote locations by various communications media
(fig. 6.7).
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